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The bottled water industry in Mexico represents a new method of providing 
drinking water to a society without ties to a conventional central piped domestic water 
supply system. Mexico, the world’s leader in bottled water per capita consumption, has 
struggled to provide reliable, safe drinking water for its citizens. This study examines the 
context in which the bottled water industry rose to become the primary source of drinking 
water for a majority of Mexicans. The study shows how the combination of factors 
allowed the industry’s rapid rise from a niche market of elite and ‘healing’ waters to its 
present size. The cholera epidemic of the 1990s, the 1985 earthquake, and the financial 
crisis that left Mexico unable to invest in water infrastructure forced consumers to seek 
alternative water sources. Political factors and the liberalizing reforms of the 1980s, 
1990s and 2000s facilitated market solutions and private-public-partnerships to meet the 
needs of the Mexican citizens. The world’s largest food and beverage distributors bought 
into the market and found that the public was willing to pay cash for water bottles where 
the public water sector had failed to deliver potable water. Despite the fact that bottled 
 vii 
water is more expensive per unit of water than a centralized delivery system, consumers 
are willing to pay a high price for clean water. It is an open question whether consumers 
return to tap water even after improvements have been made, once the bottled water 
industry has been so established.  
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“Mexico has become one of the most valuable water markets  
for beverage bottling companies in the world.”  1 
 
  
Mexico is the world’s number one per capita nation in bottled water 
consumption.2 Bottled water is also the number one source of drinking water for 
Mexicans, with more than 81 percent of Mexicans reporting that for drinking purposes 
they avoid tap water (see Appendix 1).3 This report seeks to explain the evolution of the 
bottled water industry in Mexico, driven by a general insecurity in the public water 
system.4 While the bottled water industry is now expanding into emerging markets in 
Southeast Asia, Mexico is the first country to lead the world in this new model of the 
provision of potable water. The bottled water industry differs from a utility because it 
delivers drinking water with limited investment. Whereas privately or publicly owned 
water utilities require capital-intense investments in pipes, pumps, and user connections, 
the bottled water delivery system requires a treatment facility and trucks. In the last 
twenty years the bottled water industry has seized this opportunity and grown from a 
                                                
1 Southeastern Bottled Water Association, “Bottled Water Battles,” Southeastern Bottled Water 
Association: Industry News, SEBWA, April 13, 2012, accessed at Jan. 14, 2014, 
http://sebwa.org/bottled-water-battles/ 
2 IDB, Latin America’s Other Water Infrastructure, Inter-American Development Bank, Nov. 10, 2011. 
3 IDB, Latin America’s Other Water Infrastructure, Inter-American Development Bank, Nov. 10, 2011. 
4 Castano, Ivan, “Mexico’s Water War,” Forbes, March 12, 2012. 
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niche market valued in the low billions to a $135 billion industry and it continues to 
expand.5 In Mexico, officially the world’s largest per capita bottled water market, 
government authorities estimate that less than half of the bottled water market is 
accounted for, with half attributed to informal sales.6 A recent study by the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB) reveals the industry is much larger than previously 
estimated (see Appendix 1).7  
This report describes the rise of the private bottled water industry in Mexico. It 
has evolved in a context of public infrastructure degradation, financial instability, 
political reform, and an outbreak of cholera. In addition major multinational firms have 
chosen to invest under these political, economic and social factors. This study also 
addresses the strategies of the leading industrial actors as they built an industry that can 
now compete throughout Mexico for water distribution. 
This study began with archival and bibliographic research in Spring 2013 as part 
of a The University of Texas Lyndon Baines Johnson School of Public Affairs seminar 
taught by Eugene Gholz, Ph.D. on “Policy Making in a Global Age.” Additional 
research was conducted during a Summer 2013 conference course supervised and 
directed by David Eaton, Ph.D. Field visits to carry out interviews and visit bottled 
water facilities were carried out in August, October, and December of 2013, in 
                                                
5 Farooq, Humaira, “Building an ‘electronic’ ecosystem for water manufacturing industry,” Waypoint 
Systems, Tech & Science, Dec. 9, 2013; and Rodwan, John, "Bottled Water 2011: The Recovery 
Continues: U.S. and International Development and Statistics," report at website International Bottled 
Water Association Statistics, International Bottled Water Association, 2012, accessed on Jan. 3, 2014 at 
http://www.bottledwater.org/economics/industry-statistics 
6 Barrientos, Alberto, “Buscan Agua Purificado,” Reforma, March 22, 2007. 
7 IDB, Latin America’s Other Water Infrastructure, Inter-American Development Bank, Nov. 10, 2011. 
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Guadalajara, Mexico; Las Juntas, Mexico; Matamoros, Mexico; and Ciudad Juarez, 
Mexico. Additional interviews were carried out in July 2013 in Austin, Texas, with 
senior Mexican officials who work at Mexico’s national water commission, 
CONAGUA, when these officials came to Austin to attend a bi-national water quality 
modeling training event.  
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CHAPTER 1: THE BOTTLED WATER INDUSTRY OVERVIEW 
  
Some analysts report that 700 million to 1.7 billion people (10 to 20 percent) 
worldwide lack access to clean water and that such numbers may climb.8 An additional 
20 percent of the world’s population live in water stressed regions, defined as places 
where annual water withdrawals exceed 40 percent of the total available resources.9 
Banks and global governance organizations and research institutions all predict 
shortages of water supplies for agricultural, industrial, and human needs. A range of 
international institutions from organizations such as Food and Water Watch, the World 
Bank, the United Nations (UN), and the World Health Organization (WHO) have 
proclaimed potable water shortage a major issue facing humanity in the coming decades, 
as illustrated by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s 2001 warning that water 
scarcity may become a source of conflict and war.10 It is useful in this context to 
understand the current landscape of water provision. 
                                                
8 Jaffee, Daniel and Soren Newman, “A Bottled Half Empty: Bottled Water, Commodification, and 
Contestation,” Organization & Environment, 2012, v26, n3: p391..The United Nations, The World 
Bank Millennium Goals Report, 2013, Inter-Agency and Expert Group on MDG indicators, New York, 
2013. Food and Water Watch, World Water, Food and Water Watch website, 2013; WHO, “Opening 
remarks at Budapest Water Summit,”  opening remarks by WHO Director General Margaret Chan 
published on-line Dr. Margaret Chan’s main address at the water summit, WHO, 2013, accessed  at 
http://www.who.int/dg/speeches/2013/water_sanitation_opening/en/ and OECD, Managing Water for 
All: An OECD Perspective on Pricing and Financing, OECD, 2009. 
9 OECD, Managing Water for All: An OECD Perspective on Pricing and Financing, OECD, 2009. The 
UN adopted this Relative Water Stress Index in its 2006 United Nations World Water Development 
Report. Water scarcity is reached when the ratio of water use to the renewable water supply is greater 
than 75%. 
10 Spoth, Tom, “Peace over water?” SAIS Review of International Affairs, Winter-Spring 2009, v29, n1: 
p113. 
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Provision of water to a citizenry has been one role of central governments, as in 
the Han Empire in China, the Roman Empire, the Indus civilizations, the Assyrians in 
ancient Turkey and the Aztec’s aqueducts in the Americas.11 Managing water resources 
has been both “the most necessary resource of survival" and “one of the most formidable 
natural obstacles and limitations to growth."12 Control of water can mean bountiful food 
supplies, internal security, reliable power, trade, and improved human health. The basic 
provision of safe water has paralleled the global decline in child mortality due to 
dysentery and water related diseases.13 Scientific advancements have resulted in 
advanced water treatment systems, the licensing and professionalization of water utility 
workers, and the widespread implementation of plumbing and water distribution 
systems. These services are fundamental to today’s urban environments.  
Until the emergence of the bottled water industry the civic responsibility for the 
general provision of drinking water has fallen into a range of categories: entirely public 
water utilities; publicly owned and privately managed utilities; or privately owned and 
operated utilities.14 While the benefits and challenges of public or private management 
of municipal water works are well studied, less attention has been paid to the “rapid 
                                                
11 Solomon, Steven. Water: The Epic Struggle for Wealth, Power, and Civilization. New York: Harper, 
2010: p48. 
12 Solomon, Steven. Water: The Epic Struggle for Wealth, Power, and Civilization. New York: Harper, 
2010: p18. 
13 Singh, Gopal, Title V 75 Anniversary Celebration. Child Mortality in the United States 1935-2007: 
Large racial and socioeconomic disparities have persisted over time, report for US Department of 
Health and Human Services, Health Resources and Services Administration, 2010.  In the United 
States child mortality fell by more than 98 percent from 1907 to 2007 from 1,418.8 deaths per 
100,000 to 28.6. Certainly other factors such as refrigeration, transportation, communication and the 
dissemination of germ theory played a role as well. 
14Jaffee, Daniel and Soren Newman, “A Bottled Half Empty: Bottled Water, Commodification, and 
Contestation,” Organization & Environment, 2012, v26, n3: p391.  
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growth of bottled water and its transformation into a global industry.”15 The bulk of the 
literature that does exist examines the large stream of waste that the industry produces 
and decries the ecological impact as "embedded" water is in the production of the plastic 
bottle may exceed the water volume in a bottle.16 There have been few studies on the 
significance of a nation's water being provided through bottled water to a majority of its 
citizens even though this is occurring. For example, in 2010, 66 percent of Mexicans 
reported they only drink bottled water.17 In some regions of Mexico, bottled water use is 
close to 100 percent while in others, like Monterrey, it is closer to 30 percent [see 
Appendix 1]. Neither the survey results nor the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB)  conference, "How Mexico Became the Number One Consumer of Bottled Water" 
where the survey was discussed, has been mentioned in a single academic article. There 
has been little public awareness and even less discussion and analysis of the policy 
implications of bottled water’s shift from “a niche product to a nearly ubiquitous 
consumer object in both the global North and the South.”18  
Bottled water is the commodification of water.19 Bottled water “renders water far 
more mobile and profitable than municipal water systems can."20 Since the 1990s bottled 
                                                
15 Guillen, Guillermina, “El agua inicia proceso silencioso de privatizacion en Mexico,” Noticias 
Financieras, Nov. 8, 2005. 
16 Gleick, Peter, Bottled and Sold, Island Press, 2010. p271, 2010. 
17 IDB, Latin America’s Other Water Infrastructure, Inter-American Development Bank, Nov. 10, 2011. 
18 Jaffee, Daniel and Soren Newman, “A Bottled Half Empty: Bottled Water, Commodification, and 
Contestation,” Organization & Environment, 2012, v26, n3: p391. 
19 Jaffee, Daniel and Soren Newman, “A More Perfect Commodity: Bottled Water, Global Accumulation, 
and Local Contestation,” Rural Sociology, March 2013, v78, i1: p2. 
20 Jaffee, Daniel and Soren Newman, “A More Perfect Commodity: Bottled Water, Global Accumulation, 
and Local Contestation,” Rural Sociology, March 2013, v78, i1: p2. 
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water has grown from a small unnoticed market to its present size estimated at $135 
billion.21 The emergence of the bottled water industry has presented an entirely new 
model of providing potable water to a population.22 This model is successful in part 
because it allows individual consumers access to clean water despite the questionable 
quality of water in their centralized water system. Brands compete for profit margins by 
highlighting the health and cleanliness benefits of their water. Simultaneously they resist 
regulators' attempts to submit their products to consumer safety testing. Consumers 
report that they buy bottled water for concerns over health, assuming that corporate 
water providers would not risk their brand name selling contaminated water. People 
believe that bottled water is safer than tap water,23 even when, in some markets bottled 
water is also contaminated.24 
The bottled water industry represents a new way forward as widespread water 
shortages are forecast and water is increasingly viewed as an economic good.25  Unlike 
                                                
21 Castano, Ivan, “Mexico’s Water War,” Forbes, March 12, 2012.; Farooq, Humaira, “Building an 
‘electronic’ ecosystem for water manufacturing industry,” Waypoint Systems, Tech & Science, Dec. 9, 
2013. 
22 Jaffee, Daniel and Soren Newman, “A More Perfect Commodity: Bottled Water, Global Accumulation, 
and Local Contestation,” Rural Sociology, March 2013, v78, i1: p2. 
23 IDB, Latin America’s Other Water Infrastructure, Inter-American Development Bank, Nov. 10, 2011. 
24 Gutierrez, Rey, Vega, Salvador, Ortiz, Rutilloa and Beatriz Schettino, "Presence of organochlorine 
contaminants in bottled drinking water from Mexico City," Water Science and Technology: Water 
Supply, 2012, v12, n4; Fox News, "More than 24,500 chemicals found in bottled water," Fox News, 
Jan. 13, 2014; Sukhija, Sheetal, "Beware of contaminated bottled water," IBN News, Mar. 19, 2012, 
accessed at http://ibnlive.in.com/news/beware-of-contaminated-bottled-water/240233-60-119.html. 
25 International Conference on Water and the Environment, “The Dublin Statement on Water and 
Sustainable Development,” International Conference on Water and the Environment, 1992, reprinted 
in Fishbone, Aaron ed. The Struggle for Water: Increasing demand on a vital resource, The 
International Debate Education Association, 2007. OECD, Managing Water for All: An OECD 
Perspective on Pricing and Financing, OECD, 2009, Cosgrove, William; Rijsberman, Frank, World 
Water Vision Report: Vision Statement and Key Findings, in Fishbone, Aaron ed. The Struggle for 
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previous models of water provision, with the bottled water model, providers are not 
burdened by the costs of maintenance, reconstruction, or the expansion of an aging 
water distribution system. The Organization for Economics Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) estimates infrastructure and maintenance costs are 85 percent of 
the total costs in centralized water treatment and distribution utilities.26 The bottled 
water industry avoids these capital costs, as water treatment makes approximately 15 
percent of the cost of providing water.27  
Centralized water utilities in the United States can provide one thousand liters of 
water for approximately $1 to $2 US dollars. The City of Newark, Ohio charges $0.95 
per cubic meter while The City of Austin uses a tiered scale, charging $1.84 per m3 for 
the first 2 m3 and $3.39 per m3 for each subsequent cubic meter. A similar quantity of 
bottled water would cost a consumer between several hundred to several thousand times 
as much [see Appendix 4].28  
Throughout the world, private and public water utilities have struggled to make 
the necessary investments in water infrastructure in times of increased water use and 
decreased public spending.29 Increased contamination of drinking water sources has 
further increased the costs and risks associated with public drinking water provision. In 
comparison, the bottled water industry is light and nimble. Water is treated, bottled and 
                                                                                                                                          
Water: Increasing Demands on a Vital Resource, International Debate Education Association, NY, 
2007. 
26 OECD, Managing Water for All: An OECD Perspective on Pricing and Financing, OECD, 2009: p27. 
27  OECD, Managing Water for All: An OECD Perspective on Pricing and Financing, OECD, 2009: p27. 
28 OECD, Managing Water for All: An OECD Perspective on Pricing and Financing, OECD, 2009; IDB, 
Latin America’s Other Water Infrastructure, Inter-American Development Bank, Nov. 10, 2011.  
29 OECD, Managing Water for All: An OECD Perspective on Pricing and Financing, OECD, 2009. 
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shipped out on trucks to stores and homes. Big companies can focus on high 
concentrations of people with a high willingness to pay, leaving smaller providers to 
handle less profitable routes. Cash strapped local and regional governments offer 
corporations with cash in hand concessions to the best water sources.30 In 2014, the 
bottled water industry is positioning itself for control of a market where demand will be 
ever increasing, supplies limited, and prices and profits responding in accord. 
The bottled water market is one of the fastest growing market sectors on the 
planet.31 For the past two decades the global bottled water market annually posted 
double-digit rates of growth to become a $135 billion industry in 2011.32 Some analysts 
predict sales to reach $176 billion by 2016.33 Meanwhile, within the industry, the 
leading companies report double-digit quarterly growth in their water divisions.34 They 
are currently vying for dominant positions as they expand into Southeast Asia.35 The 
industry is on track to reach an annual volume of 450 billion liters by 2021, up from 275 
billion in 2012.36 
                                                
30 Royte, Elizabeth, Bottlemania: How water went on sale and why we bought it,” Bloomsbury, New 
York, 2008. Barlow, Maude and Tony Clark, Blue Gold: The fight to stop the corporate theft of the 
World’s Waters, New York Press, New York, 2002, p53; Gleick, Peter, Bottled and Sold, Island Press, 
2010: p271; Snitow, Alan, Thirst: fight the corporate theft of our water, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 
2007. 
31 Bank of America, The Global Water Sector, Bank of America and Merrill Lynch, Sept. 28, 2011: p33. 
32 Farooq, Humaira, “Building an ‘electronic’ ecosystem for water manufacturing industry,” Waypoint 
Systems, Tech & Science, Dec. 9, 2013, cites Marketline Research’s 2013 Bottled Water Industry 
report. 
33 Farooq, Humaira, “Building an ‘electronic’ ecosystem for water manufacturing industry,” Waypoint 
Systems, Tech & Science, Dec. 9, 2013. 
34 Business Monitor International, “Industry Trend Analysis: Bottled Water Sales Continue to Grow,” 
Oct. 18, 2013.  
35 Castano, Ivan, “Mexico’s Water War,” Forbes, March 12, 2012. Nestle Annual Report 2013. 
36 Hall, Richard, The 2012 Global Bottled Water Congress, Zenith International, 2012. 
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The bottled water market began as a niche market of spring waters sold to 
consumers who appreciated the mineral content. In the latter half of the twentieth 
century two of the world’s largest food processors and distributors, Nestlé and Danone, 
bought up the world’s most elite bottled water brands. Then, at the turn of the century, 
traditional beverage manufactures such as The Coca-Cola Company, PepsiCo, and the 
Dr. Pepper Snapple Group, entered the market and invested to secure rights to water 
concessions to guarantee long term growth. Danone, Coke, and Pepsi, along with Nestlé 
and are the industry’s market leaders, together sharing a third of the global market and 
over 80 percent of the Mexican market.37  
While the United States, Latin America and Europe have made up the industry’s 
largest consumers, the contested markets are now the new emerging economies. China 
and India hold the highest potential.38 Southeast Asia, with high regional consumption 
levels and large populations, has the most potential to grow.39 Some developing 
countries experiencing increased urbanization and highly centralized governments have 
been unable to maintain and expand public water systems to meet the needs of their 
citizens. A centralized water system offers cost efficiencies through economies of scale 
but tends "to institutionalize dependence on national water agencies because it does not 
develop strong indigenous organizations that can operate, maintain, repair, and extend 
                                                
37 Castano, Ivan, “Mexico’s Water War,” Forbes, March 12, 2012. Nestle Annual Report 2013; Hall, 
Richard, The 2012 Global Bottled Water Congress, Zenith International, 2012. 
38 Gleick, Peter, The World's Water Volume: the biennial report on freshwater resources Vol. 7, Island 
Press 2012.  
39 Hall, Richard, The 2012 Global Bottled Water Congress, Zenith International, 2012. 
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the system after it’s built.”40 China’s bottled water market, arguably the world’s second 
biggest market (in total sales) grew at 11.9 percent per year from 2005 to 2010.41 Some 
sources proclaim China as the current market leader while others proclaim Mexico as 
the winner.42 In 2011 China had a 95 liter per person rate of bottled water consumption, 
less than one quarter of Mexico’s, yet they have 11 times Mexico's population.43 With 
60 percent of China’s cities facing seasonal water shortages, 100 cities experiencing 
severe water constraints, and increasing concerns with groundwater contamination, in 
China "bottled water, therefore acts as a necessity."44  With almost unlimited potential to 
expand, the Chinese market represents the bottled water frontier.   
Forecasts for dire water shortages continue to drive this discourse. While the 
severity of the predictions vary, organizations agree that water shortages will become 
common throughout the world over the next two decades. The Bank of America’s Water 
Sector Report predicts that global water demand will “overshoot supply by 40 percent 
by 2030.”45 The OECD reports that 47 percent of populations in OECD countries will 
                                                
40 Eaton, David, “Extending Rural Water Supplies in Developing Countries,” Journal of American Water 
Works Association, June 1985: p11. 
41 IDB, Latin America’s Other Water Infrastructure, Inter-American Development Bank, Nov. 10, 2011. 
42 Hall, Richard, The 2012 Global Bottled Water Congress, Zenith International, 2012. IDB, Latin 
America’s Other Water Infrastructure, Inter-American Development Bank, Nov. 10, 2011. 
43 IDB, Latin America’s Other Water Infrastructure, Inter-American Development Bank, Nov. 10, 2011, 
and Business Monitor International, “Industry Trend Analysis: Bottled Water Sales Continue to 
Grow,” Oct. 18, 2013.  
44 Business Monitor International, “Industry Trend Analysis: Bottled Water Sales Continue to Grow,” 
Oct. 18, 2013. 
45 Bank of America, The Global Water Sector, Bank of America and Merrill Lynch, Sept. 28, 2011: p33. 
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lack access to safe water by 2030, and these estimates do not take into account climate 
change impacts. 46 
Both supplies of potable water and competition for water among user support 
effect this spurt in the bottled water industry. As developing countries grow 
economically their industrial demand for water will grow.47 The Bank of America 
analysts state that industrial water demand represents 22 percent of global demand but in 
developed markets that rises to as high as 59 percent. As emerging markets move from 
primarily agricultural to industrial, the change is expected to impact water allocation.48 
“Emerging markets divert water from agriculture to industry as they ramp up their 
economic growth efforts via large-scale industrialization. Worringly, this is often being 
done with scant regard for the environmental or social impact.”49  
As the world’s population continues to increase and as consumers demand more 
protein, more water will be required to grow the crops necessary to feed them.50 
Projections suggest the global population will grow 50 percent by 2050 "while the 
world's water resources will remain constant."51 Water allocated for agriculture 
represents 70 percent of the global total but varies significantly by country. While global 
analysts suggest that global agricultural water demand will increase by 50 percent by 
2030, this could be even more dramatic in agricultural economies such as Mexico. In 
                                                
46 OECD, Managing Water for All: An OECD Perspective on Pricing and Financing, OECD, 2009. 
47 Bank of America, The Global Water Sector, Bank of America and Merrill Lynch, Sept. 28, 2011: p33. 
48 Bank of America, The Global Water Sector, Bank of America and Merrill Lynch, Sept. 28, 2011: p33. 
49 Bank of America, The Global Water Sector, Bank of America and Merrill Lynch, Sept. 28, 2011: p19. 
50 Bank of America, The Global Water Sector, Bank of America and Merrill Lynch, Sept. 28, 2011: p20.  
51 Bank of America, The Global Water Sector, Bank of America and Merrill Lynch, Sept. 28, 2011: p20. 
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Mexico, 84 percent of the water consumed is used in agricultural production, 12 percent 
is used by the municipal sector, and 4 percent is used by the industrial sector.52 Finally, 
“water scarcity is also emerging as a direct consequence of water quality issues.”53 
Advocates for a market solution to the unfolding water crisis suggest a fourth 
cause of water scarcity: non-revenue water (NRW) or water that is consumed without 
generating revenue. The market solution argument states that only by adequately pricing 
water can its use reflect its value and its waste minimized.54 NRW, attributed to older 
water systems with broken, leaking pipes and fittings, exceeds 50 percent of the current 
quantities of extracted water in some regions of the world.55 "Two-thirds of the volume 
of water is lost in low- and middle-income countries."56 Mexico’s two largest cities lose 
40 percent of their water due to leakage.57 The market solution for water scarcity 
suggests that as water becomes more valuable the cost-benefit analysis will eventually 
favor fixing these leaky systems.  
In Mexico, for decades the government has subsidized the cost of potable water 
infrastructure. In a time of limited financial resources there is little public will to 
undertake the massive public investments needed to repair centralized water systems. In 
2000 in Mexico City, for instance, the water rate charged to consumers was $0.175 per 
                                                
52 Ortiz, Gustavo, Administracion del agua: Aplicacion de instrument de politica hidraulica en 
escenarios alternativos, IMTA, 2001: p22. 
53 Bank of America, The Global Water Sector, Bank of America and Merrill Lynch, Sept. 28, 2011: p15.  
54 Bank of America, The Global Water Sector, Bank of America and Merrill Lynch, Sept. 28, 2011: p16. 
55 Bank of America, The Global Water Sector, Bank of America and Merrill Lynch, Sept. 28, 2011: p16. 
IDB, Study of Non-Revenue Water, 2013.   
56 Bank of America, The Global Water Sector, Bank of America and Merrill Lynch, Sept. 28: p16.  
57 Bank of America, The Global Water Sector, Bank of America and Merrill Lynch, Sept. 28, 2011: p16; 
Josephs, Jeremy, “Megacity Mexico: A Tale of Leaks and Shortages,” Water World, August 13, 2013. 
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m3, while the cost of providing the water was $0.60 per m3.58 This difference is in part 
due to having to produce 40 percent more water than needed because of leaks. 
According to recent reports Mexico is losing 11 m3 to 12 m3 per second.59 
While the current manifestation of the bottled water industry is new, selling 
water is as ancient as civilization. Historically there have always been opportunities for 
businessmen to sell water to outlying homesteads during times of drought or to small 
towns when water sources became contaminated. In Mexico, Agueros, men who drove 
wagons loaded with barrels of water, linked distant water holes and springs to ranches 
and small towns. Famous for their regularity these men earned tips and lived in 
poverty.60 Even into the twentieth century in some United States markets water was 
provided through similar vendors.61 While the sale of water for individual consumption 
is not new, today’s bottled water industry did not develop from these previous 
distribution channels. Today’s bottled water industry is well organized, highly 
capitalized, and profit centered.62 Forbes states that Coca-Cola currently earns 15 
percent profit from their bottled water sector while higher priced Danone earns 18 
percent.63  
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While bottled water may be cheaper to provide than centralized water 
transmission and distribution systems, it is much more expensive to the consumer. In 
general bottled water is priced between several hundred to hundreds of thousands times 
as expensive per liter as tap water (see Appendix 4).64 Compared to municipal tap water 
systems the bottled water industry is a sleek and profitable industry. Unlike tap water 
distribution systems, bottled water sales can be carried out without the upfront 
investment of the billions of dollars necessary to provide a city with safe water through 
pipes, pressure and plumbing. As those who can afford to buy bottled water do so, there 
is less support for paying more money for tap water – despite a lack of resources for 
municipal water systems and investment requirements.  
The debate around public/ private provision of water is comparable to the 
transportation debate of personal autos versus public transportation. The personal car has 
shifted consumer expectations. As more people drive personal cars there has been less 
widespread support for both private and public transit.65 In many areas of the United 
States, by the end of the twentieth century many small towns lacked public 
transportation altogether.66  
This analogy suggests that the provision of bottled water as a solution to the 
water crisis may come at the expense of the reinvestment in the public water 
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infrastructure. There are general arguments that this is the case, but as of 2013 there 
have been no studies testing bottled water's impact on public water infrastructure 
spending. As companies such as Coca-Cola and Nestlé announce plans to invest billions 
in bottled water technology, water concessions, and delivery networks, it is important to 
begin to understand the developments taking place, the specificity of cases, and to begin 
to outline directions for future research. 
In the past decades, research has focused on evaluating the outcome of water 
management privatization.67 For a broad spectrum of views, Aaron Fishbone’s The 
Struggle for Water (2007) is a good start. The private management of public water 
works by the French based Suez and Veolia corporations throughout the world along 
with the differences in outcomes of private management in England, Wales, France and 
elsewhere have long been studied and evaluated. Whether the private sector is able to 
out-perform the public sector is still being debated.68 Yet the third way forward, the 
bottled water industry, has attracted little academic attention.69 It has silently enjoyed 
meteoric sales and profits growing from a niche market of high-end mineral waters to a 
                                                
67 Fishbone, Aaron ed. The Struggle for Water: Increasing Demands on a Vital Resource, International 
Debate Education Association, NY, 2007. 
68 Brubaker, Elizabeth, “Privatizing Water Supply and Sewage Treatment: How far should we go?” 
reprinted in Fishbone, Aaron ed. The Struggle for Water: Increasing Demands on a Vital Resource, 
International Debate Education Association, 2007, Segerfeldt, Fredrik, “Private Water Saves Lives,” 
reprinted in Fishbone, Aaron ed. The Struggle for Water: Increasing Demands on a Vital Resource, 
International Debate Education Association, 2007; Hardin, Garrett, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” 
Science, Dec. 13, 1968, v162, n3859; and Wieda, William, “A general economic critique of water 
resources,”  reprinted in Fishbone, Aaron ed. The Struggle for Water: Increasing Demands on a Vital 
Resource, International Debate Education Association, 2007. 
69 For a comparison, an internet-based University of Texas libraries search reveals 33 dissertations with 
water privatization in the title while the same search for bottled water reveals 18. Only 3 of the bottled 
water dissertations are about the bottled water industry.  The others are about bottled water quality, 
marketing or consumer preference.  
 17 
model of how drinking water might be provided to the global population in the future. 
Peasants in Bolivia and elsewhere have taken to the streets to protest against the 
privatization of their tap water delivery systems, yet even in these hostile environments 
the bottled water industry thrives.70 
While the municipal water system seeks to provide safe drinking water at a price 
that allows for maintenance and expansion, the bottled water industry seeks to provide 
the smallest serving sized unit container possible. The big four bottled water companies 
have announced 350 ml or 8 oz bottles for adults and smaller, baby sized bottles for 
babies. While the municipal water system struggles to convince the public to levy rate 
increases sufficient enough to sustain the system, the bottled water industry spends 
billions on advertising to convince customers that the high price provides security and 
safety and health.  
While municipal water systems consume high levels of energy in water treatment 
and pumping, the bottled water industry consumes much higher levels in the production 
of the bottle.71 According to published calculations, the 33 billion liters of bottled water  
sold in the US in 2007, required 50 millions of barrels of oil to make the bottle.72 
Additional environmental footprints are created through the transportation of bottled 
water and through the bottle's disposal. Bottled water also uses more water than it 
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delivers. Each bottle of water has “embedded water,” the water used in the manufacture 
of the bottle. For example, Gleick estimates that between two and three times the size of 
the bottle is the “embedded water” in each bottle. In other words, the “embedded” water 
in a 500 ml plastic bottle is between one and two liters.73 The bottled water industry 
argues on its behalf that the majority of the water that it sells in emerging markets is in 
large refillable 10 and 20 liter bottles. While that may be true, the industry continues to 
make increasing profits from smaller and smaller non-refillable containers. Thus far the 
industry has proven remarkably capable of shaping the market in its own favor. 
Understanding what is taking place in the bottled water industry is relevant both 
in the context of developing and developed countries. In developing countries much of 
the demand for bottled water can be attributed to rapid industrialization, water 
contamination and the inability of the public system to keep pace. However, the issue of 
public sector investment in water infrastructure that facilitated the bottled water 
industry’s growth in Mexico, China, India and throughout Africa is present in the United 
States as well. One reason for the rise of the bottled water industry in the case of Mexico 
was the inability of its federal government to reinvest in the country’s aging and failing 
water infrastructure. As demonstrated by Detroit in 2013 and numerous cities throughout 
the US, the ability of the public sector to maintain water infrastructure is questionable in 
tough economic times. For example, in Washington, D.C. the average water pipe is 77 
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years old and “a great many were laid in the nineteenth century.”74 Throughout the 
United States, from Boston to Cleveland to McAllen, Texas, cities are using water 
systems designed for conditions, urban life and the water demand, of the early twentieth 
century that are outdated, failing and in desperate need of reinvestment.75 The American 
Society of Civil Engineers warns that by 2040 the United States is on track to face a 
$143 billion funding shortfall in water infrastructure construction and reinvestment. The 
situation is the same, and worse, in Mexico. Peter Gleick warns that if the citizens of the 
United States do not prioritize reinvestment in our nation’s infrastructure we too could 
follow Mexico’s path.  
  
“Those of us who live in the richer nations of the world are buying more 
and more bottled water because we increasingly fear or dislike our tap 
water, we distrust government’s ability to regulate, monitor and protect 
public water systems adequately, we can’t find public fountains anywhere 
anymore, we are convinced by advertisers and marketers that bottled water 
will make us healthier, thinner or stronger, and we’re told that it is just 
another benign consumer ‘choice.’ If we let our tap water systems decay, 
however, soon bottled water won’t be a choice, it will be a necessity as it 
already is in countries without safe tap water.”76 
  
 
                                                
74 Hasley III, Ashley, “Billions needed to upgrade America’s leaky water infrastructure,” Washington 
Post, Dec. 22, 2012. 
75 American Society of Civil Engineers, 2013 Report Card for America's Infrastructure, ASCE, 2013. 
76 Gleick, Peter, Bottled and Sold, Island Press, 2010: p171. 
 20 
 
CHAPTER 2: MEXICO AS A CASE STUDY 
  
In many ways Mexico is a perfect case study to understand what is happening in 
the bottled water industry. While China offers the case of the fastest growing market 
with the biggest potential, Mexico is the best example of a fully developed bottled water 
market. While the US market continues to be the biggest as measured by revenue, its 
growth has stalled since the 2008 financial crisis and the Mexican market is expected to 
overtake the US in size in 2014.77 While China's market is bigger in billions of liters 
sold, Mexico enjoys the highest per capita consumption rate in the world, more than 
twice that of the US and three times that of China (see Appendix 2) .78 
There are several key reasons to examine the Mexican bottled water industry. 
One factor is the market's sheer size. Recent surveys have revealed that the market is 
many times larger than previously estimated.79 A second element is that in Mexico 
bottled water is now the primary source of drinking water for a majority of the nation's 
population! More than 60 percent of all Mexican's report drinking only bottled water for 
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drinking water.80 The third reason for study about the Mexican case is that ample, 
accessible information exists to document the combination of socio-economic and 
political factors that allowed the bottled water industry to thrive, which is not true in 
China. While Mexico may differ from the other nations that lead the world in bottled 
water consumption, Mexico’s industry has faced similar conditions to many developing 
countries.  
As reported at the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) seminar, “How 
Mexico Became World’s Top Consumer of Bottled Water,” as of 2011, Mexico is the 
number one bottled water market in the world.81 The United States continues to sell 1.5 
billion more gallons per year of bottled water than Mexico. However, Mexico’s per 
capita consumption dwarfs that of the U.S. According to the International Bottled Water 
Association, in 2011, Mexicans consumed an average of 248 liters per person compared 
to 110 in The United States.82 The IDB’s 2011 survey, estimates annual Mexican per 
capita consumption at 480 liters per person.83 The International Bottled Water 
Association’s survey was an analysis of official sales while the IDB survey was a 
household survey. Even with the smaller estimate from the International Bottled Water 
Association, Mexico's per capita consumption has grown at a rate of 7 to 8 percent per 
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year for the entire last decade.84 The Mexican water market as measured in total dollars 
is expected to overtake the U.S. in the 2013-2015 timeframe. In 2011, the Mexican 
bottled water market represented $9 billion in sales while the US market at the same 
time represented $12 billion.85  There is also concern that at least 50 percent of the 
Mexican market is unaccounted for, attributed to small unregulated bottled water 
companies and vendors.86 While the Mexican market continues to grow by 8 to 10 
percent per year, the US market has become stagnate with 1 to 3 percent growth.87 If 
these trends continue the Mexican market will reach $15 billion by 2015 and surpass the 
US in total sales. This is more significant when both nation’s Gross Domestic 
Production Per Capita (GDPPC) is taken into account. The United States currently 
enjoys a GDPPC five times larger as that of Mexico.88 It is true that bottled water sales 
in China have doubled from 4 billion gallons in 2006 to over 8 billion in 2012, in 
volume now equal to Mexico’s. However, because of China’s large population, eleven 
times Mexico’s, their per capita consumption lags behind both Mexico and the US.89  
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The Mexican market differs from some other nation’s in other aspects. The U.S. 
bottled water market represents the historical model of bottled water consumption 
generated through the marketing of status, convenience, health and choice. In contrast, 
the Mexican market represents a situation where consumers have little choice in whether 
or not to consume bottled water.  Whether bottled water is safer could be debated but the 
widespread perception is that tap water is dangerous [see Appendix 1].90  
The Chinese bottled water industry would make a fascinating case study as well 
due to its rapid rise and incredible potential represented by a population of 1.3 billion.91 
Unfortunately sources of information necessary for a comprehensive study are not 
readily available to outsiders at this time. According to the International Bottled Water 
Association (2012), “While Asian nations attained prominence among the world’s 
bottled water markets when measured in total volume, the most populous countries 
generally do not have high per-person intake levels. … Despite its status as the third-
largest market, mainland China had a per capita consumption number well below the 
global norm even though intake swelled by more than 2.5 gallons per person from 2006 
to 2011, nearly doubling.”92 While it is clear that China and the largest countries as 
measured by population have the potential to become the leading bottled water markets 
in sales volume and per capita consumption, these are not well developed markets. In 
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contrast, Mexico is a well developed market, with 66 percent of citizens relying on 
bottled water for personal water consumption. 
While many of the details of the rise of the bottled water industry in Mexico 
differ from other developing country contexts, many of the structural conditions present 
in Mexico can be seen in developing countries throughout the world. The lack of re-
investment in existing drinking water infrastructure and the inability of the government 
to keep pace with urban expansion and increased drinking water demand are two such 
factors that were and are present in Mexico and arguably in contexts throughout the 
world.  The struggles of centralized governance systems to provide local services is 
another shared condition.93 A political system with little transparency, lots of patronage, 
and a reliance on foreign capital were factors that facilitated the bottled water industry’s 
growth in Mexico. While Mexico represents a decentralized government on paper, it 
continues to be centralized.94 This is exemplified by the 2004 water reforms which put 
control of the nation's water into the hands of local committees, but the federal rules 
regarding how these committees would function were never published.95 While local 
regional governments and land owning organizations are given power, the allocation of 
funds and formal permissions continue to be granted from the federal level.  
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The combination of these factors creates conditions that are often taken 
advantage of by well organized, highly capitalized foreign interests. The World Bank in 
2007 warned that the transition to democratic rule in Mexico was at risk of political 
capture by special interest groups.96 Mexico has an economic system characterized by 
debt and inflation, known for inequality and corruption.97 Transparency International’s 
2013 Corruption Perception Index ranks Mexico amongst the world’s most corrupt 
nations, with little oversight and enforcement.98 Similar conditions to these are found in 
developing contexts throughout the world, making the case of Mexico representative of 
how the bottled water industry may expand into new territories.99  
Furthermore, the rise of the bottled water industry reflects the contamination and 
overuse of the world’s freshwater resources. According to the World Wildlife Fund, 
throughout the world, freshwater resources as measured in ecosystem health and species 
population have continued on a downward trend since the 1970s.100 Mexico is no 
exception as industrial growth and urban expansion have combined to leave Mexico’s 
rivers amongst the most contaminated in the world.101 This trend has left many 
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communities without reliable safe sources of water leading in parallel to the growth of 
the bottled water industry.  
In each nation the bottled water industry has developed within specific political, 
economic and environmental conditions and, “If you go to Mexico or Manilla, you’ll see 
the same thing, but they have emerged independently.”102 The industry has adopted 
varied tactics in order to ensure growth under these varied national contexts. Different 
firms are active in different regions, although one constant is the role of major beverage 
companies shifting into the bottled water market and employing their already well 
developed distribution networks. For example, in Mexico’s The Coca-Cola Company 
and Coca-Cola Femsa illustrate how major firms secured market shares. Mexicans 
already led the world in annual per capita consumption of Coca-Cola, as in 2011, 
Mexicans consumed 728 servings of Coca-Cola products compared to 408 in the United 
States.103 The fact that President Vicente Fox (2000-2006) was the CEO of Coca-Cola 
Mexico prior to becoming the president of Mexico, offers additional insight into the 
political justification for the public support for the move towards the commodification of 
water. As a former Coca-Cola executive Fox was a very public proselytizer of the 
superiority of the private sector in the provision of services.104 Thus, the sheer size of the 
bottled water industry in Mexico, the contextual circumstances describing its rise, and its 
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CHAPTER 3: MEXICAN BOTTLED WATER’S FOUR ORIGIN STORIES: AN 
EPIDEMIC, AN EARTHQUAKE, A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE AND THE ADVERTISING 
AGE:  
  
There are at least four origin stories of how the bottled water industry became the 
primary source of drinking water in Mexico. A cholera epidemic, a devastating 
earthquake, a financial crisis and advertising all played a role in the growth of the 
bottled water industry. Cholera, the earthquake and the financial crisis all fall on the 
demand side of the equation, creating general distrust in the government's ability to 
guarantee the safety of the nation’s tap water. On the supply side, by limiting public 
access to information and third party testing of the quality of bottled water, the private 
sector has been able to create an impervious image of providing a safer product.105 There 
have been economic, environmental, social and political crises in Mexico that have 
combined to help drive distrust for the public water sector. In each of these crises, when 
the public sector was unable to provide safe water, the private sector stepped in. 
Arguably, each time this has happened the public sector has become perceived as less 
trust worthy and the private sector has evolved to be viewed as a safer. 
This chapter examines four events in Mexico identified as the reasons the 
prominent and dominant rise of the bottled water industry in Mexico. One cause cited 
                                                
105 Weida, William, “A general economic critique of water resources,” reprinted in Fishbone, Aaron ed. 




for the industry’s rise was the outbreak of cholera in the 1990s. Hundreds of thousands 
of Mexicans were sickened and many died as a result of exposure to contaminated 
water.106 The second factor was the earthquake of 1985 which damaged portions of 
Mexico City’s centralized public water infrastructure. The 1985 earthquake destroyed 
governmental administrative buildings including the nation’s water commission 
headquarters. While the earthquake happened before the cholera epidemic, the damaged 
water infrastructure was left unrepaired and thus magnified the government’s inability to 
control the cholera epidemic. The earthquake also marks a moment when Mexican 
citizens began looking outside their government to resolve their problems. The 1985 
earthquake even destroyed the government’s water commission headquarters among 
dozens of other federal offices. The third factor was the financial and debt crisis that 
began in 1982 and lasted through 1994. This crisis left Mexico unable to make the 
necessary investments in the nation’s public water system. The world’s financial 
institutions came to Mexico’s rescue, bringing along conditions that Mexico reform the 
water sector. The final factor, often overlooked, is the narrative of manufactured 
demand. The bottled water industry has spent billions of dollars attempting to convince 
consumers that tap water is dangerous and that bottled water is the only safe and healthy 
option. For example, even in Monterrey where older sections of the city have reliable tap 
water, large percentages of the population prefer bottled water.107 In other regions not 
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known for high quality tap water, such as Guadalajara, Xalapa, or Tuxtla Gutierrez, 
almost the entire population reports drinking only bottled water.108 The following 
sections examine each of these factors in detail. 
  
  
THE CHOLERA STORY 
  
The 1990s outbreak of cholera in Mexico motivated people to seek safe drinking 
water sources and bottled water. Cholera is a sickness spread through contaminated 
water sources. The presence of cholera and the inability to control it are signs of failing 
and poorly maintained water systems.109 It has been theorized that the historical 
outbreaks of cholera have led to investments in public drinking water systems. This 
chapter will discuss that theory and present evidence that water systems and water 
system maintenance are dependent on a community's economic capacity and that lacking 
this capacity. As Mexico did not have the financial capacity, it did not invest in water 
systems even after or during a cholera outbreak that would sicken hundreds of thousands 
and motivated millions to find bottled water. 
 Mexico’s National Institute of Health Director of Epidemiology Jaime 
Sepulveda, stated “the year 1991 will be remembered as the one during which cholera 
re-entered the New World.”110 In early 1991, cholera spread to Latin America. By the 
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end of 1991 were 391,220 reported cases in 16 counties throughout the Americas.111 
While more than a third of the total cases occurred in Peru, Mexico’s first confirmed 
case was reported in June, 1991. 
Sepulveda, who rose to become Mexico's Vice-Minister of Health during the  
crisis, defended Mexico's response to the crisis.112 While Sepulveda paints the picture of 
a stable, developed nation under control of the situation, by the end of the 1991 there 
were 2,382 cases confirmed.113 By 1995 the total would grow to 16,430 cases, reported 
by the Mexican Institute of Health. By the time the epidemic was declared over in 2001, 
there were 45,978 officially recognized cases from 1991 through 2001.114 The Mexican 
government reports that there were no confirmed cases of cholera from 2001 until 2012.  
While these are the official estimates that Mexico reported to the World Health 
Organization, there are discrepancies in the data. A review of articles with the words 
“government denies cholera” in the headline shows cases in which Mexican authorities 
allegedly have denied the claims of local health officials of the existence of cholera. 
During 2007 to 2012, while there were fewer than 10 official cases of cholera, internal 
reports from Mexico's health institute reported 150,000 suspected cases Mexico and the 
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distribution of 2.7 million treatments.115 A recent outbreak in 2013 shows that Mexico is 
still dealing with cholera.116 
The epidemic began “in an isolated mountainous area in the center of the 
country."117 The official version of the story reports that infected drug traffickers landed 
on an illegal airstrip and thus spread the disease throughout the countryside.118 The 
entire outbreak which began in Peru in 1991 is attributed to a single Chinese ship which 
dumped its sewage in a bay in Lima. “Over the next two years, this one outbreak 
gradually contaminated the water supply of all but two countries in Latin America, 
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 Illustration 1: Geographic spread of cholera, 1991-2001  
 
 
Source: Mexico Secretary of Health, Programa de Accion Especifico: 2007-2012: Cholera, Mexico 
Secretaria de Salud, Subsecretaria de Prevencion y Promocion de la Salud, 2008, p1. 
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Historically cholera has been one of the “most important causes of morbidity and 
mortality.”120 While the word in its present form has been with us for at least 500 years, 
the disease “was first described by Hippocrates in the 5th Century BC.121 Low levels of 
the disease have persisted throughout time but large outbreaks have come in waves and 
affected millions. Seven epidemic outbreaks have occurred since the beginning of the 
nineteenth century.122 The outbreak that began in 1991 in Mexico was part of the 
seventh wave. While cholera has been reported as controlled in Mexico, this wave of the 
epidemic continues.123 
According to official reports and decrees by Mexico’s federal government, 
cholera has been wiped out since 2001. The WHO and state agencies within Mexico 
present evidence that cholera continues to be an issue.124 For example, in 2013, the 
WHO reports that there were 184 cases in Mexico. Also in 2013, in one single state 
health agency in Hidalgo, Mexico, there were 1,900 reported cases.125 While official 
reports state that there have been zero cases from 2001 to 2012, official reports 
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simultaneously indicate that from just 2001 through 2006, 598,091 “suspected cases” 
were treated, involving the distribution of over 12 million treatment doses.126  
Scholars who study global cholera incidence report that nations under-report 
outbreaks because the presence of cholera is one of the most fundamental development 
indicators: 
Partly because of the high cost of sanitation, the response of governments 
to impending cholera has often been to deny it, rather than grudgingly pay 
for unaffordable sanitation ... Contemporary cholera denial is so rampant 
that in this age of information most authorities estimate that WHO figures 




News stories of cholera affect trade and tourism because cholera is associated 
with poor sanitation and water contaminated with fecal matter. Cholera cases imply a 
failure in a government to provide safe drinking water to its citizens and a basic 
indicator of a nation’s governance capacity and stability. The World Health 
Organization, considers the presence of “the global threat” of cholera as “one of the key 
indicators of social development.”128 The WHO states that it is not a threat in countries 
with even “minimum standards of hygiene,” but that cholera continues to be a threat 
“where access to safe drinking water and adequate sanitation cannot be guaranteed.” As 
such, the continued presence (and denial) of cholera in Mexico is one of the 
characteristics that defines Mexico as a developing nation.  
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The importance of the cholera outbreak to the bottled water industry is primal. In 
1991, for the first time, the federal government recommended to its citizens that they 
seek safe water from private sources. As reported in Forbes:  
Beverage companies owe their strong profits in Mexico in large part to a 
pervasive mistrust of tap water that took root in the early 1990s amid 
cholera outbreaks. Health authorities encouraged Mexicans to turn to 
bottled water, which led to a proliferation of unregulated companies 
hawking “purified” water.”129 
 
 
News reports during the cholera outbreak stated that the bottled water industry 
was the main benefactor of the epidemic. “The problem of cholera gave rise to much of 
this industry, because in general Mexicans are looking for water with greater protection 
and lack of contamination,” said the President of the National Association of Producers 
and Distributors of Bottled Water (ANPDAP) Gabriel Caburrubias in 2000.130  
According to the newspaper La Reforma, Mexico has had bottled water 
companies doing business in the country for 50 years. However, it was not until 1992, 
shortly after the cholera outbreak, that the rush for the oro azul [blue gold] began.131 
“The importance of the sales of bottled water is reflected in the fact that the Bank of 
Mexico began [in 2002] to incorporate it in the National Consumer Price Index, utilized 
to calculate inflation."132 
Some sources state that the federal effort to deal with the cholera epidemic led to 
an improved public water delivery system but the strong odor of chlorine led consumers 
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to seek other options.133 This is one version of what happened. In general Mexicans 
faced a lack of reliable information after citizens began dying of cholera.134 The 
government remained silent. Armando Monroy Hermosillio, director of the Biological 
Science Department at Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico at Iztapalapa was 
quoted in 2005, stating his concern that, “the government did not inform the population 
of Mexico City whether their tap water was apt for human consumption.”135 Hermosillio 
also stated that in 2005, Mexico was the “only nation in Latin America whose citizens 
depended entirely on bottled water.”  A 2002 article in the Monterrey newpaper El 
Norte, states that at that time Mexico’s bottled water industry had claimed 10 percent 
per year growth, growth which “coincided with the reappearance of cholera.”136 
In the water treatment literature the idea of cholera as an impetus for the national 
or state level investment in water treatment has also been discussed. To this end, Hamlin 
calls it “the best-known case of the myth of the good epidemic.”137 Citing numerous 
articles reflecting the idea that cholera forces communities into making water treatment 
infrastructure investments, Hamlin says these are “the most conspicuous cases in public 
health of applying history to policy—or perhaps more accurately, appealing to history in 
political conversation.” 
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Hamlin reports that the thought that Central and South Americans would adopt 
sanitary reforms, modeled by the nineteenth century European and North American 
cases, was a vision imagined by the developed world.138 In this way the Western world 
framed Latin America as a different case than that of Asia and Africa “where cholera 
was, at best, simply controlled by oral rehydration, antibiotics and vaccinations.”139 
Latin America was less foreign and could therefore become more modern. Hamlin states 
that the history of England and the U.S. having invested in water infrastructure in 
response to cholera outbreaks is just one of several theories. Fire protection, the fire 
insurance industry, investors in New York investing in public infrastructure as a 
mechanism to circumvent banking laws and a host of other reasons are equally as likely, 
he suggests.140  
One recent dissertation suggests that Coca-Cola was at least one of the architects 
behind modern water treatment as they tried to standardize their products first in the 
United States and then throughout the world.141 Historians have noted, Hamlin states, 
that “outside of a few great cities, this technical achievement had come rather more 
recently than a cholera-as-cause model would suggest: it was a matter less of the 
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nineteenth century than of the first half of the twentieth.”142 In 1988 John Brown carried 
out a study looking at factors that would effect the probability “that a city will decide to 
build” water infrastructure. He used variables such as industrial demand, a community’s 
financial resources, incidence of cholera and the cost of the system.143 For evidence 
Brown examined more than 200 communities throughout the Rhineland, Westphalia, 
Hannover and Holstein regions of Germany. He compared data on cholera mortality, 
employment in the industry, per capita income from tax records and infrastructure costs 
based on estimates derived from population size, population density and the demand for 
industry.  His reported that the costs, ability to pay and industrial demand were highly 
correlated predictors of whether a community would invest in sanitary water 
infrastructure. Cholera incidence did not correlate to infrastructure investment. An 
earlier study showed similar results.144 “The results suggest that even during the period 
immediately following the cholera years of 1865-1867, crisis in public health played a 
secondary role to costs, industrial demand, and the income of the median voter in 
determining the course of sanitary reform. As the 1880s wore on, the threat of cholera 
all but disappeared and Rhenish towns never again experienced an epidemic.”145  
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Alternative theories of why developed nations invested in sanitary water 
infrastructure abound. However, there is little doubt that investment in sanitation and 
public water infrastructure is a primary mechanism for controlling and reducing the 
incidence and severity of cholera. Mexico did not build public water supplies in 
response to this public health crisis. In fact, Mexico did not rebuild much of its colonial 
era water infrastructure.146 In many regions of Mexico, including the nation's biggest 
cities, residents continue to be served by water infrastructure built in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century.147 They did not significantly reinvest in water treatment or even 
make an effort keep pace with urban and industrial growth. In general the condition of 
the nation’s rivers and waterways worsened. In several now famous incidents public 
officials throughout Mexico have declared sections of rivers as open sewers in order to 
avoid the implications of laws that prohibit contamination, as sewers are not similarly 
protected.148 The most famous of these cases occurred near the El Salto waterfalls on the 
Santiago River. In January 2008, an 8-year-old boy, Miguel Angel Lopez fell into the 
river. He was rescued immediately but within two days he fell ill: 19-days later he was 
dead. “Arsenic in Miguel Angel’s blood was 10 times the fatal dose.”149 While the 
contamination of the Rio Santiago is an extreme case, throughout Mexico rivers receive 
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untreated waste. In 2005, only 35 percent of Mexico's population was connected to a 
public sewage treatment plant.150 
While the case of Mexico does not support the theory that cholera forces 
investment in water infrastructure, it does offer a glimpse at how the market responds to 
such a dilemma. Where the government failed to act, the bottled water industry did act.  
One CONAGUA official interviewed for this study reports that as the cholera 
epidemic broke, he began to purchase his water directly from the Coca-Cola bottling 
plant in Mexico City. Even though providers bring bottled water, including Coca-Cola 
water, directly to customer's homes they are reputed to sometimes refill the bottles with 
untreated tap water, even though Coca-Cola water has a higher per unit price tag, this 
senior official stated he was willing to commute further and pay more in order to 
guarantee that the water was “the good water.”151 
Cholera is at least part of the origin story of the bottled water industry in Mexico, 
however, so is Mexico’s failure to reinvest in water infrastructure after the 1985 
earthquake. 
  
THE EARTHQUAKE STORY  
  
Mexico’s 1985 earthquake story is a second factor facilitating the growth of the 
bottled water industry. The earthquake that struck in 1985 was one of the largest natural 
disasters in recorded history. Much of Mexico City including the headquarters for the 
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national water commission and the city's water infrastructure were destroyed. 
Furthermore, it has been argued that the earthquake presented an opening for actors 
outside of Mexico to provide answers to Mexico's problems. After the earthquake the 
international community sent physical relief which was turned around at the border by 
the De la Madrid administration.152  
The earthquake story as it is retold in this section, is entangled with the financial 
crisis, told in the following section. The earthquake that destroyed Mexico City’s center 
and many of the governmental and institutional buildings of the nation's capital was the 
capstone of an era of unemployment, monetary devaluation and massive inflation. The 
earthquake left the infrastructure of the region in shambles and portions of Mexico 
City’s water lines remain broken and unreliable even in 2013.153 
The 8.1 magnitude earthquake that struck Mexico City on September 19, 1985 
was followed 36 hours later by a “second tremor of an almost equal magnitude,"154 an 
historical catastrophe.155 “The urban concentration of Mexico City multiplied the 
disastrous effects of the earthquake.”156 Sources cite various death counts. Estimates 
                                                
152 Vale, Lawrence and Campanella, Thomas, The Resilient City: How Modern Cities Recover from 
Disaster. 2005: p256. 
153 Interviews conducted in Austin with CONAGUA officials, July 19, 2013. 
154 Vale, Lawrence and Campanella, Thomas, The Resilient City: How Modern Cities Recover from 
Disaster. 2005: p255. 
155 Colegio Nacional de Enfermeras,  “Mexico Earthquake,” International Nursing Rev. 1986, v33. N4. 
And Berman, Raquel and Gloria Roel, “Encounter with Death and Destruction: The 1985 Mexico City 
Earthquake,” Group Analysis 1993, v26. 
156 Berman, Raquel and Gloria Roel, “Encounter with Death and Destruction: The 1985 Mexico City 
Earthquake,” Group Analysis 1993, v26: p88. 
 43 
suggest that 9,500 people died and 30,000 were injured.157 “Official statements later 
acknowledged 5,000 killed and 14,000 injured; but an independent final tally accounted 
for 2 million residents temporarily made homeless and thousands dead.”158 Extreme 
accounts suggest that as many as 40,000 died and that, “More than 800,000 residents 
were ultimately forced to abandon their homes and sleep in the open air.”159  
Researchers suggest that both Mexico City’s government and the national 
government lost significant credibility because of the earthquake.160 It was perceived 
that the government was corrupt and unable to handle the crisis. The Mexican citizenry 
were left to fend for themselves. In the first days after the crisis the international 
community offered to send relief aid but the Mexican federal government refused to 
accept help.161 The citizens knew that “a supply of pneumatic saws and jackhammers 
might have saved” lives, but the government was unable to respond.162 “Trained 
international disaster teams stood at the ready while the PRI-led government deliberated 
and finally set up a bureaucratic fund through which all foreign aid was to be 
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channeled.”163 Instead of rescue squads the federal government sent out the army in an 
attempt to maintain law and order. The earthquake destroyed the city’s historic center 
and thus the institutions “that sustained the city as a whole were disabled if not 
destroyed.”164  
The citizenry, who lacked even a “place to bury their dead” had “no reliable 
authorities to whom they could turn for assistance.”165 Even weeks later reports coming 
out of the devastated region painted a grim portrait of aid not reaching its destination. 
One account from the era attributed the diverted aid to corruption stating that even with 
“supplies and money flooding into the country from around the world, the truth is that 
those supplies have not arrived at their destination and the homeless have to find other 
recourses in order to survive.”166 The crumbling buildings left by the earthquake brought 
to light the injustices of past government collusion and corruption with private 
contractors.167 Many of the buildings that collapsed, including hospitals, schools and 
housing projects, “had been recently constructed by the government” while older, 
allegedly better constructed buildings, “were unharmed.”168 Buried segmented aqueducts 
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located in the southeast part of the city were severely damaged.169 The disaster destroyed 
the city’s water supply and distribution system. “An estimated 5.3 million people [were 
left] without water, a condition never previously experienced in a major city."170  
Mexico City’s water system had been previously damaged and left unrepaired 
after a large 1979 Guerrero earthquake. The 1985 event was the final straw. There were 
more than 60 pipeline breaks on the main aqueduct and the primary and secondary 
distribution systems sustained several thousand breaks.171 Five years later “an average of 
2,000 leaks in the distribution network” were still being repaired each month.172 Even 
without these breaks the water requirements of the 20 million residents of the Mexico 
City metropolitan zone presents “a formidable challenge” because of the natural 
environment.173   
Mexico City sits in a mountain basin at 6,000 feet and relies on aquifers for 72 
percent of the city’s water.174 According to a study in 1995, the pumping rates combined 
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with deeper extraction wells has “resulted in subsidence rates of up to 40 centimeters per 
year in some areas. … [The] net subsidence over the past 100 years has lowered the 
central, urbanized area of the [metropolitan zone of Mexico City] by an average of 7.5 
meters.”175 The result has been extensive damage to the city’s infrastructure, including 
building foundations and the sewer system.176  
Even without the earthquake Mexico City’s water supply network was in trouble. 
Broken water lines and open unlined wastewater canals presented the risk of cross 
contamination. Mexico City receives significant and severe storms that sometimes 
deposit 10 percent of total annual precipitation in a single event. Seasonal floods put 
everyone at risk as the canal waters flooded and over ran their banks. Subsidence in the 
city center of Mexico had grown severe enough that by the 1950s it was necessary each 
year to pump flooded parts of the town dry.177 At the time of the earthquake 90 percent 
of residents counted on water service but 90 percent of “municipal wastewater from the 
MCMA [metropolitan area] remained untreated.”178 At that time 90 percent of industrial 
waste went untreated into the wastewater canals.179 
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“Leaks in the distribution system are a major cause of concern for both 
water quality and water supply. When the soil is permeated by sewage 
from leaking sewers and from other sources, such as unlined canals 
carrying sewage, then leaky pipelines will be infiltrated with 
contaminated water when pressure is low.”180 
 
 
 The first independent study of Mexico City’s tap water in 1979 revealed that 10 
out of 25 samples contained “one or more of the active forms of pathogenic 
organisms.”181 More than a decade later another evaluation found 7 of Mexico City’s 14 
wastewater treatment plants were operating below capacity and the evaluation lacked 
data on the others.182 Six years after the earthquake, at the time of the cholera outbreak, 
one report found 31 percent of the wells in the Eastern District of Mexico City failed 
physical and chemical water quality standards, while the State of Mexico reported 23 
percent of its wells did not meet standards for coliform bacteria.183 
Whether the region’s water infrastructure was destroyed by the earthquake or 
subsidence or an aging system combined with a growing population, Mexico City had a 
higher incidence of infectious intestinal diseases and mortality than the rest of the 
country. The higher rates of infant mortality due to infectious diseases and water borne 
pathogenic deaths could be traced to regions in the south of the city which coincide with 
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regions where the earthquake had destroyed the water infrastructure.184 The same is true 
throughout the nation as a whole. “The major cause of death among children in irregular 
and rural areas in Mexico continues to be diarrheal diseases.”185  
It would be a mistake to romanticize about Mexico City’s water infrastructure 
prior to its decay. In 1990, 3 percent of households in Mexico City and 9 percent in the 
State of Mexico were reported to lack access to public water supplies. However, of those 
who used utility furnished treated domestic water supplies, in the metropolitan water 
service area of the State of Mexico, only 52 percent had an “in-house” water source.186 
A third of the region’s 15 million people reported a “yard source.” This was “a great 
accomplishment in light of the 17 percent” reporting an “in-house” water supply in 
1960.187 The percentage of coverage actually grew to 62 percent in 1980 but fell to 52 
percent during that decade, because of the earthquake and a soaring population in need 
of new water connections. Throughout the region the quantity and quality of water 
varied and bottled water began to be seen as an alternative to a questionable public water 
supply. “Many poor residents substitute bottled water or soft drinks for drinking water 
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instead of using piped water, an expensive, but presumably safe alternative to water 
supplies in which they have little confidence.”188 
The World Bank identified another problem in the economics of water delivery 
in Mexico City in the era after the earthquake. In the 1990s the city was collecting only 
$0.10 per cubic meter at a time when it was costing them $1.00 per cubic meter to 
supply the water.189 In Mexico, water is generally considered a constitutional right. 
“Water use has been historically tied to the principle that water resources are the 
property of the state and thus should be a free, constitutional right for every citizen.”190 
Older Mexicans have traditionally believed in the provision of water as part of the 
promise of the revolution.191 This is at least part of the reason why CONAGUA reports 
that 60 million Mexicans do not pay for the tap water they receive.192 One analyst from 
Global Water Intelligence refers to this situation in Mexico as an “entrenched resistance 
among many to paying for water.”193 
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In July 2013, Mexican officials with the Comision Nacional del Agua 
(CONAGUA, the national commission of water) visited Austin during a bi-national 
water conference organized by the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at The 
University of Texas. On the last day interviews regarding their perspective on the bottled 
water industry in Mexico were carried out in an informal and anonymous way. One 
CONAGUA official, a “Technical Sublevel director” A.J., said that in his neighborhood 
in Mexico City the water infrastructure has been in disrepair since the earthquake. A.J. 
has a role both in his federal position overseeing water quality in Mexico City and as the 
patriarch in a large family providing safe drinking water to his family. He said he buys 
as many as 10 garafons per week (1 garafon holds 19 liters).194 A.J.’s family is 
representative of the traditional Mexican extended family living together. He now hosts 
two of his daughters and several grandchildren. The 10 garafons are bought at $2 dollars 
each and represent a significant portion of his earnings. According to open source 
website information, A.J.’s salary is $588 (USD February 2014 exchange rate) per 
month of which more than $85 per month, 14.6 percent, is spent on bottled water.195 A.J. 
also stated that he bathes his grandchildren in bottled water, as he believes that the 
contaminated water coming from his tap is dangerous even for bathing. The Inter-
American Development Bank’s bottled water use survey shows that 11 percent of 
Mexicans do not trust tap water to bathe infants (see Appendix 1).196 
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A recent New York Times article confirms this. “In Iztapalapa and in many 
communities across Mexico, talk of tap water is a constant – whether there is any, how it 
smells, what color it is, or whether it carries sand, mud or unspecified insect life.”197 
Even though Mexican water officials in their official capacity have urged consumers to 
believe that their water is safe, once people experienced yellow odorous tap water, their 
faith in the public system has been broken.198 “After having seen yellow water, brown 
water, people just don’t want to take the risk.”199 The IDB survey confirms as 66 percent 
of respondents reported that “personal experience” was how they found out their water 
was contaminated.200 
The following is a brief repetition of how one CONAGUA official remembers 
the role of the earthquake in the situation. 
The earthquake was an accelerator of the bottled water industry. After the 
earthquake there was no longer water in many people’s homes. There were 
people in the streets. There was no water pressure. The biggest problem at 
the time was that there was no drinking water. … In some homes there was 
a bad smell – the smell of contamination – the pipes had broken and the 
water was contaminated so the people couldn’t drink water from the tap. 
 
In my case, we started buying water after the earthquake in 1985. From 
1985 until now. There was a problem in the administration of potable 
water. Solids started to show up in our water. Like earth. Since then, at 
least for our household, we buy 7 garafons per week. Recently that has 
gone up because we have a baby. We are six people with a baby but the 
baby is the biggest consumer of bottled water because we bathe him with 
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bottled water. The tap water has a lot of solids in it. It has sands. That’s the 
problem. I feel as if it’s an excessive expense. For instance, our food can’t 
be washed with this water. Later I speak with my friends and they make fun 
of me because the bottled water might have been just filled up with tap 
water. But in my case we justify it because the water that we use to bathe 
the child doesn’t have these visible contaminants and even more, we boil it. 
  
 
Another official echoed the sentiment explaining how the sewer and water pipes 
had been ruptured and contaminated each other.  
For sure the sewer line is lower than the water line but we just don’t know 
what condition the entire system is in. Now when we have leaks we don’t 
know if it’s the drainage line or the water line. It’s disturbing to the citizens 
that Mexico City does not have control over the quality of water. But I 
think there is more to it than just that. After the earthquake you began to 
see foreigners traveling with their bottled water. They would bring 
suitcases full of bottled water when they came to visit. I think the 
capitalists saw the opportunity to take advantage of the situation to promote 
the sale of bottled water. The capitalists started to feed off the distrust of 
water. Everything started in Mexico City and then worked its way all the 




The correct response would have been to bite the bullet, rebuild the system, and 
improve it. Yet, at a time when Mexico could not even afford to make the most basic 
repairs, investing in a water system that replaced “existing elements with one which 
could have enhanced seismic resistance would be economically impractical.”201 “Mexico 
                                                
201 Joint Academies Committee on the Mexico City Water Supply, Mexico City’s Water Supply: 
Improving the Outlook for Sustainability, 1995. P75.  
 53 
City’s earthquake hit right in the midst of a deepening economic crisis, which placed 
limits on financial resources—both public and private—for the city’s reconstruction.”202  
Estimates of repair costs were beyond what Mexico as a city, a state, and a 
nation could pay. “Disaster research experts considered this earthquake to be one of the 
most destructive and economically costly of the century in terms of overall loss … with 
estimates for reconstruction and rehabilitation costs hovering between $5 and $10 
billion.”203 As will be discussed in the next section, Mexico was already initiating 
austerity measures in order to pay $12 billion a year in the interest of its $96 billion of 
foreign debt.204 “On the day of the earthquake, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
citing the nation’s lack of economic development, canceled Mexico’s line of credit.”205 
In light of the destruction the IMF granted Mexico a six-month reprieve and temporarily 
reopened their line of credit.206 
To further understand how the bottled water industry grew to dominance in 
Mexico it is useful to add a third story-line: Mexico’s economic instability. Failure of 
the public sector is at the heart of the story of the rise of the private sector, with a 
“decline in living standards,” and the financial crises that had gripped the country in the 
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years prior to the earthquake.207 The following chapter will examine the effect of the 
financial crisis.  
 
THE FINANCIAL STORY 
  
Mexico’s financial troubles in the 1980s and 1990s contributed to its national 
inability to meet the infrastructure needs of the growing urban population. After the 
earthquake and during the cholera epidemic, Mexico could not afford to provide safe 
drinking water for the people. The widespread perception of corruption in key 
governmental institutions caused the Mexican people to look to foreign countries and 
foreign models of growth and the private sector for assistance. In the midst of the 
financial crisis, and partially because of the financial crisis, Mexico reformed 
management of the public water system which opened the way for the bottled water 
industry. 
Mexico’s political and economic history are tied together. The early part of the 
twentieth century was marked by a series of revolutions and counter-revolutions. 
Depending on who is retelling the narrative, the period of 1914 to 1929 can be 
considered one long revolutionary period or several shorter ones.208 After an uprising 
that began in 1914, the Mexican Constitution was written and adopted in 1917. The 
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Constitution called for revolutionary reforms intended to end the church-state 
governance and return lands to the peasants. Despite the constitutional declarations, 
regional hacienda owners remained politically powerful and many of these reforms were 
not enacted for decades.  
In 1926, President Plutarco Calles enforced the constitutional articles that called 
for the end of the relationship between the church and state. For example, the Catholic 
Church lands were repatriated and religious acts, including public prayer and mass, 
became illegal.209 Rebellious priests were hung.210 The reforms limiting the Church 
began the counter-revolution, known as the Cristero War (La Cristiada). This ended in a 
compromise allowing the Catholic Church to exist but excluded from politics. In 1934, 
President Lázaro Cárdenas’ enforced the controversial Article 27 of the constitution that 
appropriated the nation’s lands and waters into the hands of the landless peasants and 
ended the feudal hacienda system. Under the new Ejido system farmers did not have the 
right to sell their lands but they could reap rent for as long as they lived.  
Mexico’s golden era lasted from 1940 to 1970.211 For nearly two decades prior to 
the 1970s Mexico’s path was of “high and sustained growth with relatively low 
inflation.”212 Living standards rose steadily. Mexico stepped away from an economy 
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dominated by subsistence agriculture and towards a market economy. Gains in 
productivity were brought about through agricultural chemistry and hybridization. Early 
results were astonishing: crops that traditionally produced one third of a ton at harvest 
began producing one, two and more tons per hectare.213 The surplus translated into 
material gains as the ratio of exports to imports improved and the value of the peso 
stabilized. The era of good times coincided with new petroleum discoveries by the 
nationalized oil giant PEMEX.214 
 “Friction began in the 1970s, when discovery of enormous oil reserves triggered 
a feeling among Mexicans that, after a long history of relative poverty, they would be 
able to carry out rapid development and make Mexico a major force in world affairs.”215 
The new oil reserves coincided with turmoil in the Middle East, the oil embargo and the 
rise of oil prices. The Mexican dream was launched.  
Global oil prices rose by a factor of four from 1969 to 1979. “Rising oil exports 
and huge hydrocarbon reserves spawned wild growth, wild spending and wild 
borrowing.”216 With increased exports and increased foreign investment Mexico 
increased overall spending. President José López Portillo, convinced that oil prices 
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would hold, presided over a period of “free spending” and borrowed billions.217 
Expansions of social programs were financed by oil revenues and the promise of future 
oil sales. From 1970 to 1980 Mexico’s foreign debt grew from $3 billion to $57 
billion.218  
With the drop in oil prices in 1981 the good times ended in a financial crash. Oil 
prices fell as dramatically as they had risen.219 Mexican federal revenues fell and the 
government was unable to make payments on its debts.220 Throughout this period 
Mexico would take on more debt.221 At the time of the first crash in 1982, Mexico’s 
external debt was the largest among developing countries. Much of that debt was loaned 
by U.S. institutions or the IMF of which US institutions were major contributors.222 
More than half of the debt was with the United States. Bank of America and Citibank 
were Mexico’s largest private creditors.223 Mexico, desperate to generate earnings and 
foreign currency, became the biggest source of U.S. oil with terms favorable to the 
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U.S.224 For the next two decades the Mexican economy would be tied directly to the 
price of oil. The rise and fall of the Mexican economy parallels the price of oil [see 
Illustration 2 and 3]. A third market crash in the mid 1990s caused yet another wave of 
monetary devaluation and economic restrictions.225 A 1994 market crash led a banking 
crisis. By 1995 there were no loans being made in Mexico. Prior to this banks were 
charging 60 percent interest.226 Illustrations 2 shows the historical price of oil and the 
significant fall in price n 1981. This corresponds to Illustration 3 which shows Mexico’s 
GDP peaking in 1981-82 and then falling and stalling until the 1990s when the price of 
oil recovers. Illustration 3 further shows the instability of the Mexican peso as it was 
devalued three times from 1980 to 1994. 
In 1981, Mexican government planners counted on $20b in oil sales but “exports 
amounted to only $14 billion.”227 “In only a matter of months, the country plunged from 
a period of unparalleled prosperity into its worst financial crisis in memory.”228 In 1982, 
in the last months of President Portillo’s term in office, he ordered the nationalization of 
the banks. Foreign currency reserves were frozen and Mexico announced that they were 
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unable to repay their debts. In the months before this, the peso “all but collapsed” and 
the president had few options and the future looked bleak.229  
To meet the shortfall in revenues, the government borrowed more. 
Simultaneously capital flight and currency devaluation led to a rescue by the United 
States and the IMF on the condition that the Mexican federal government control 
spending. Under the 1982 debt program authored by the IMF, Mexico agreed to cut its 
public sector spending in half in five years, from 16 percent to 8 percent of GDP, and 
then to bring it down to 3 percent.230 Several days into his administration President 
Miguel de la Madrid announced a 10-point program “as key elements in the austerity 
program required by the International Monetary Fund.”231 De la Madrid “moved quickly 







                                                
229 Goodsell, James, “Why Mexico had no choice but to nationalize banks,” The Christian Science 
Monitor, Sept. 3, 1982.  
230  The Washington Post, “Crisis Raises Political Concerns in the U.S.,” The Washington Post, April 16 
1983. By 1983 that debt had climbed to $80b and according to The Times of London, “President of 
Mexico who came to power in a financial crisis tackled the country’s economic woes,” The Times, 
April 3, 2012, in 1983, this figure was actually $100b. 
231 Riding, Alan, “Bankers Cheer Mexico’s Austerity Plan,” The New York Times, Dec. 3, 1982.  
232 McCaughan, Edward, “Mexico’s Long Crisis,” Latin American Perspectives, Summer 1993, v20, i78: 
p16. 
 60 
Illustration 2: Historical Oil Prices  
 
Source: WTRG Economics  
 
 
Illustration 3: Financial Fragility and Financial Crisis in Mexico 
 
Source: Macroeconomica, v57, i3, July 24, 2006 
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The country's growing indebtedness meant the debt increasingly took center 
stage. This increasing debt corresponds “to the increasing dominant position of 
transnational finance capital in Mexico’s ruling bloc.”233 There was a large exodus of 
foreign currency as those who could flee fled and it became difficult to attract direct 
foreign investment. “Yet even so clearly pro-business a president was unable to coax 
much capital back into the country.”234  
The crisis had an effect on the quality of life on the Mexican population. Rapid 
industrialization had doubled the nation’s Gross National Product in the 1970s. In the 
1980s GNP peaked and began to decline. For example, the Gross Domestic Product per 
Capita (GDPPC) decreased by 15 percent from 1982-1988.235 “During the 1982-90 
period, the standards of living of the majority of Mexico’s population were depressed to 
the point of dangerously stretching the limits of the legitimacy of the post-revolutionary 
regime.”236 From 1980 to 1992, real wages declined 40 to 60 percent as a result of 
austerity, wage controls, inflation and the removal of price controls.237 The 1982 crisis 
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was followed by a sharp rise in inequality, partially attributable to the fall in oil 
prices.238 
While the government’s response to the earthquake cemented the public’s 
distrust, it was preceded by national civic strikes, taking place in 1983 and again in 
1984.239 Throughout President Miguel de la Madrid’s administration (1982-1986) there 
were numerous widespread strikes, marches and civil protests.240 As Alan Riding 
correctly predicted at the time: “Poor workers and peasants, whose purchasing power 
actually fell because of inflation during the 1978-1981 boom, also seem certain to grow 
restive as the financial crisis translates an economic slump into even greater 
hardship.”241  
The financial crisis unfolded as a major drought affected agriculture 
production.242 In addition to the impact generated by the falling price received for their 
exported oil, now Mexico was forced to import food.243 The period of 1968-1976 was 
marked by civil strife after which, when Mexico attempted to enact austerity measures, 
“unions, peasant organizations, popular urban movements, and university mobilizations 
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seriously challenged the state’s traditional ability to contain class conflict.”244 
Exaggerated governmental response, including the use of force, only fomented further 
distrust of the government.245 These conflicts restricted the state’s ability to enact the 
austerity measures. 
Thus a Mexico already experiencing falling oil revenues faced an insufficient 
supply of food, hunger, drought, protests, monetary devaluation and frozen bank 
accounts, when the earthquake hit. Major sections of the city’s water infrastructure 
would be left in ruins for decades.246  
The very day of the earthquake, Sept. 19, 1985, the IMF froze Mexico’s credit.247 
The banks did not plan the earthquake and thus quickly allowed Mexico a short 
extension but Mexico was in financial trouble. The harsh economic reality of stagnation, 
inflation and the roller coaster currency exchange markets would last through the 1990s. 
“The government responded by loosening up its stabilization policies and announcing 
the end of austerity.”248 The IMF responded by suspending Mexico’s financing. “In 
response the budget was further cut in August 1985” and the earthquake “dimmed the 
hopes of recovery.”249 In 1987 the Mexican markets crashed again and the peso was 
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devalued and inflation soared to 150 percent.250 The bad times would spread into the 
1990s and Mexican markets would hit a new low in 1994 at the end of President Carlos 
Salinas de Gortari’s administration (1988-1994). 
The 1980s economic collapse provides the context under which President Miguel 
de la Madrid (1994-2000) faced the estimated billions of dollars needed to modernize 
and repair Mexico’s municipal water supply systems. President De la Madrid opted to 
invite external markets. “[De la Madrid] set Mexico on the path to the free market."251 In 
1986, De la Madrid would sign the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade committing 
Mexico to the World Trade Organization terms and conditions. His successor Salinas 
would sign North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
Mexico is a poor country. At the time of the signing of the 1994 NAFTA more 
than one third of Mexico’s 4 million farm families were subsistence farms.252 For 
comparison, at the same time the United States had 2.2 million farm families.253 In the 
past century Mexico’s demographics have shifted from 70 percent rural to 70 percent 
urban while the country’s population has grown from 10 to over 100 million. 254  Despite 
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the shift from rural to urban, there are more people in Mexico’s rural villages than ever 
before. Agricultural intensification and modernization has required fewer laborers and 
the supply of unemployed workers pushed wages down. Today, more than 45 percent of 
the nation’s 117 million live below the government’s official poverty line as measured 
in income.255 Mexico’s poverty line is $177 (April 2014 conversion) per month for 
people surviving in urban settings and $113 for people surviving in rural settings.256 The 
poverty rate has declined in recent years but as the population has continued to grow, the 
absolute numbers of poor people has risen. Today 53.3 million Mexicans live below the 
official poverty line.257 There are 9 percent living in extreme poverty, which is measured 
as those earning less than $85 per month in urban areas and $60 per month in rural 
areas.258 The Mexican agency responsible for measuring poverty, CONEVAL, uses a 
multidimensional yardstick and shows Mexico’s poverty rate to be even more extreme. 
CONEVAL measures intensity of deprivations and finds that only 20 percent of 
Mexicans “are not poor and not vulnerable.”259 The multidimensional measurement 
considers deprivations such as lack of access to education, access to health services, 
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access to social security, housing quality, basic services and food security.260 
CONEVAL reports that 80 percent of Mexicans today live with one if not multiple 
deprivations, while the mean for Mexico as a whole is 2.4 social deprivations.261 
In Mexico a standing joke goes: ask a farmer how they survived the great 
depression of 1982, or the peso devaluation of 1994. The farmer responds: “nothing 
changed.“ Despite the oil boom and subsequent market liberalizations, not much 
changed in the relationship between the economy and Mexico’s poorest who continued 
to live day by day. What has changed however, is their relationship to water. 
With estimated billions in needed water infrastructure repairs, Mexico found 
itself once again without the hard currency or the credit to build the necessary water 
supply or sewage systems. By 2000, 78 percent of the nation’s residential wastewater 
and 85 percent of the nation’s industrial wastewater continued to go untreated.262 
Untreated household and industrial wastewater has contaminated the nation’s drinking 
water sources.  In 2002 approximately 93 percent of the nation’s surface waters were 
classified as contaminated.263 Inadequate water treatment, ruptured existing water lines 
and rapid urban expansion combined with non-point source pollution meant that 
populations throughout Mexico were being exposed to contaminated water. CONAGUA 
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estimated it needed $70 billion to build new or repair current treatment plants to meet 
the nation’s needs for safe drinking water.264 The money was just not there.265 Mexico’s 
financial crisis morphed into a water crisis as even the aquifers would begin to show 
signs of over-exploitation and in many cases, contamination. As people sought out 
options for the bottled water industry found an opportunity. Simply put, “when no other 
safe sources of drinking water are available locally, people must purchase bottled water, 
even though it is often more costly than gasoline.”266 
  
THE STORY OF MANUFACTURED DEMAND 
  
The fourth factor that led to the rise of the bottled water industry in Mexico is 
manufactured demand. Because of the earthquake and the financial crisis the federal  
government could not supply sufficient clean water for consumer demand. The bottled 
water industry was able to supply a need by addressing this shortage. The cholera 
narrative tells a story of a consumer base seeking a safe alternative to contaminated tap 
water. These stories describe a supply and demand equation where the bottled water 
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industry was able to meet growing demand. Missing from the story thus far is the 
characterization of the bottled water industry as actor and agent.  
In contrast to the other narratives, the International Bottled Water Association 
attributes the industry’s growth to its actively “enticing consumers away from other 
packaged beverages perceived as less wholesome than bottled water” through 
advertising.267 The bottled water industry grew at a time when per capita consumption of 
cola drinks leveled off and consumers became aware of their waistlines. While Mexico 
surged ahead of the world in per capita bottled water consumption it also led the world 
in Coca-Cola consumption, obesity and diabetes.268 The four industry leaders in Mexico 
(Coca-Cola, Nestlé, PepsiCo. and Danone) are heavy spenders when it comes to 
advertising even though all four have almost global universal recognition. Coca-Cola 
spent $2.9 billion in global advertising in 2010.269 Nestlé’s 2013 global marketing 
budget was similarly $2.9 billion.270 PepsiCo. prefers to spend advertising as a fixed 
percentage of revenue. While Coke spends about 8 percent of revenue on marketing 
PepsiCo spends 3 percent, equal to $1.7 billion in 2012.271 Danone, the leader in 
Mexico, spent $1.5 billion in 2011.272 
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Advertising giants have built an entire consumer culture around encouraging 
consumers to buy things that they do not need. “Global bottled water consumption has 
increased even though the quality of municipal tap water is improving in many 
countries.”273 Of course, the quality of municipal tap water did not improve in countries 
like Mexico. In countries like Mexico, the bottled water industry served consumers 
when the public sector was unable to deliver. 
Advertising can help initiate habits, such as ‘taking a bottle of water with you as 
you head off to work’ or ‘grabbing a bottle anytime you get in the car;’ these visions of 
trendy, happy drinkers of bottled water were key to the development of the bottled water 
industry.274 Consumers “orient their lives around consumption” and as markets get 
developed consumption patterns develop.275 An examination of the bottled water 
industry’s “early marketing strategy shows that they tried to market to emotional 
appeal.”276 The elite brands of bottled water were advertised as trendy, cool, and 
fashionable, to allow consumers to feel stylish and rich. As the beverage companies 
entered the market with repackaged tap water, differentiation between ostensibly equal 
                                                
273 Marcussen, Helle; Holm, Peter and Hans Hansen, “Composition, Flavor, Chemical Foodsafety and 
Consumer Preferences of Bottled Water,” Comprehensive Reviews in Food Science and Food Safety, 
2013, v12: p333. These authors report that global consumption had rose 23% from 2004 to 2012 to an 
average 30 liters per person per year. 
274 Holt, Douglas, “Constructing Sustainable Consumption: From Ethical Values to the Cultural 
Transformation of Unsustainable Markets,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, 2012. 
275 Holt, Douglas, “Constructing Sustainable Consumption: From Ethical Values to the Cultural 
Transformation of Unsustainable Markets,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, 2012. 
276 Holt, Douglas, “Constructing Sustainable Consumption: From Ethical Values to the Cultural 
Transformation of Unsustainable Markets,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, 2012. 
 70 
brands required well financed advertising strategies. Bottled water was presented as 
clean, healthy, fit.  
In the United States advertising campaigns have also counter-positioned 
themselves to public tap water  (this was unnecessary in Mexico.) 277  In early 2000, 
Pepsico. Chairman Robert Morrison declared tap water to be the biggest enemy of the 
soft drink industry.278 One case occurred in 2006, when top-shelf bottled water brand 
Fiji ran a media campaign that featured the slogan: “It says Fiji because it’s not bottled 
in Cleveland.” In its defense, the Cleveland Water Department tested Fiji and a number 
of other bottled waters and found that Fiji water had higher contaminant-levels 
Cleveland's water – although both tested below United States Safe Drinking Water 
Standards.279  
Peter Gleick reports of other examples of bottled water marketing campaigns in 
the US disparaging tap water. “There is a war on for the hearts, minds and pocketbooks 
of tap water drinkers, a huge market that bottled water bottlers cannot afford to 
ignore.”280 Gleick promotes a movement he calls “take back the tap,” which lobbies for 
drinking fountains and has created a phone application that locates public drinking 
fountains.  
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In the US, the clean and healthy image that the bottled water industry uses to 
promote itself also contrasts to the growing mistrust of governmental provision of public 
goods.281 This mistrust is “fed by stories of corruption, regulatory failings, collusion” 
and “stories of carcinogens in the water.”282 The widespread retelling of stories of 
illness, such as the 1993 cryptosporidium outbreak in Milwaukee that killed 69 and 
sickened hundreds, contributed to the industry’s growth in the United States.283 The lack 
of trust in the public drinking water systems is reinforced through a mix of news stories 
about pathogenic outbreaks and chemical pollutants and occasional poor sensory quality 
of tap water.284 For example, the contamination of a water treatment plant from a 
chemical spill in Charleston, West Virginia in January of 2014, turned more than 
300,000 people into instant bottled water customers.285 Months later, despite assurances 
from authorities, customers continued to buy bottled for drinking, cooking and 
washing.286  
                                                
281 Holt, Douglas, “Constructing Sustainable Consumption: From Ethical Values to the Cultural 
Transformation of Unsustainable Markets,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, 2012. 
282 Holt, Douglas, “Constructing Sustainable Consumption: From Ethical Values to the Cultural 
Transformation of Unsustainable Markets,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, 2012. 
283 Marcussen, Helle; Holm, Peter and Hans Hansen, “Composition, Flavor, Chemical Foodsafety and 
Consumer Preferences of Bottled Water,” Comprehensive Reviews in Food Science and Food Safety, 
2013, v12: p333. 
284 Marcussen, Helle; Holm, Peter and Hans Hansen, “Composition, Flavor, Chemical Foodsafety and 
Consumer Preferences of Bottled Water,” Comprehensive Reviews in Food Science and Food Safety, 
2013, v12: p333. 
285 Reuters, "Restaurants reopen with bottled water after West Virginia Spill," Reuters USA, Jan. 12, 
2014. 
286 Rogers, Heather, "Don't Drink the Water: West Virginia After the Chemical Spill," Rolling Stone, 
March 12, 2014. 
 72 
While in the United States bottled water draws customers away from tap water, 
in Mexico, there was no need to convince consumers that tap water was unsafe. The 
general public was already aware and concerned of the dangers of tap water. The bottled 
water industry only had to convince consumers that bottled water was not tap water. In 
fact, distrust in the public water system is so entrenched in Mexico that even after 
improvements, public water utilities have a hard time convincing consumers that the 
water is safe.287 
In Mexico, the industry has simply promoted the idea of itself as natural, safe, 
and pure. Current ad campaigns feature nothing but positive images. The market’s 
number one selling water, Danone’s Bonafont, is defined as the “light water that allows 
you to drink all you want.” It is a useful product that “helps people to eliminate 
everything the body doesn’t need, allowing them to feel physically and emotionally 
lighter.”288 Danone’s ad campaigns feature slogans such as “Living Light,” “Living 
Young,” and “Living Healthy.” Nestlé’s Pure Life water is promoted with the slogan: 
“Drink better. Live better.” Their website includes tips for “incorporating bottled water 
in our daily lives.” Nestlé’s encourages consumers to “join the hydration movement.”289 
Coca-Cola’s Ciel “is what moves you”290 while PepsiCo.’s Aquafina is the “pure water, 
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perfect taste.”291 Throughout Mexico, ads displayed on billboards, busses and in 
convenience stores show fit models confidently drinking bottled water.  
Market research into why consumers buy bottled water echo these advertising 
strategies. The reasons customers buy bottled water are: a lack of trust of the public tap 
system; the health benefits; and because it is trendy and youthful.292 In slight contrast, an 
analyst at The Economist attributed the growth in the United States to “snobbery, 
convenience, and worries about tap water.”293  
In this age of highly evolved advertising campaigns, every aspect of the bottled 
water market has been analyzed and the product has been modified and repackaged to 
maximize consumption.294 The mineral content, the taste, the smell, and whether the 
packaging “conveys luxury or casualness” have all been researched and perfected.295 
While most of the research has been dedicated to the United States bottled water 
consumer, similar results would be expected in Mexico.  
From the mid-1980s to 2000, the bottled water industry grew from a niche 
market filled by special healing waters and elite brands to a market dominated by 
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multinational companies selling repackaged tap water. Foreign firms acquired Mexico’s 
largest national bottled water companies: Coca-Cola, PepsiCo, and the Dr. Pepper Group 
came from the United States; Nestle from Switzerland, and Danone from France. These 
companies sit at the helm of what is today, “Latin America’s other water 
infrastructure.”296 Sales of bottled water in Mexico make up a small portion of these 
international firms total revenues. Firms with combined annual sales larger than 
Mexico’s foreign debt have all become household names. Byran Roberts reports that this 
was true all through Latin America. “Economic globalization would also appear to 
undermine the power of the national state. In Latin America, as elsewhere, it has eroded 
the significance of national boundaries for the movements of goods, capital and even 
people, thereby reducing the national state’s control over its territory.”297  
Nestlé was the first international player in the bottled water market in Mexico in 
the early 1990s, followed by Danone, the owner of the high-end brand Evian.298 Danone 
began to expand throughout the mid-1990s buying up local home delivery operations. In 
1990, PepsiCo. revolutionized the beverage market with the Gatorade sports drink. In 
1994, PespsiCo. introduced Aquafina, which they readily admitted was repackaged, 
filtered tap water.299 The Coca-Cola Company entered Mexico’s bottled water market in 
1999 with a comparative advantage – it was already operating a well developed 
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decentralized bottling network and the most extensive distribution system in Mexico. 
The early strategy by each of these large foreign firms followed one business plan: get a 
foothold in the market and acquire local brands. “However,” Holt writes, “once bottled 
water became a key profit center these companies did everything in their power to 
sustain the institutional underpinnings of the market, regardless of whether this 
perpetuated unsustainable consumption.”300  
Opponents of bottled water argue that the industry is doing more than merely 
advertising a product. Activists argue that the bottled water industry represents an effort 
by corporations to commodify a basic human need in a time of scarcity.301 Economist 
William Weida argued that water provision is fundamentally a democratic issue because 
“private producers do not find it in their best interest to produce everything members of 
society want.”302 He warns that attempts by the industry to minimize liability for public 
safety and health issues and “may lead directly to efforts to decrease information flows 
about the water supply process and the quality of the product.”303  
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Free market proponents argue that the world is better off because of bottled 
water.304 People who live with contaminated tap water need clean water. One view even 
argues that “the public sector is largely responsible for more than 1 billion people world-
wide who lack” access to safe drinking water.305 While no one argues that Coca-Cola, 
PepsiCo, Nestlé and Danone are self-less actors attempting to solve the predicted water 
shortage problem, it is hard to imagine that 10 years ago even they could have predicted 
the explosive growth of the industry. 
Bottling innovations also facilitated Mexico’s bottled water industry. In 1985 the 
US Food and Drug Administration (USFDA) approved polyethylene terephthalate (PET) 
for packaging and this ultra-light weight plastic allowed the beverage industry to lower 
their marginal costs of production.306 By the end of the 1980s companies began selling 
half-liter and liter sized bottles. This “allowed manufacturers to hit ever lower price 
points for water and the low weight and durability allowed for new consumer uses for 
bottled water.”307 The ability for bottled water producers to drop marginal costs of 
production would change the entire landscape.  
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Finally, the rise of the bottled water industry has been accompanied by a larger 
societal demand for convenience.308 In the past decades Americans have grown 
accustomed to the idea of shopping at a gas station or making spontaneous purchases at 
a convenience store. Paper plates and disposable everything are at the heart of the 
consumer experience, as is bottled water. Gleick, the tap water activist, points out that 
this has happened in parallel to the disappearance of the public drinking fountain.309 In 
the United States and Mexico public works projects are carried out without the 
incorporation fountains on the fears of communicable diseases and the assumption that 
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CHAPTER 4: THE MAJOR PLAYERS 
  
To understand the strategies of key firms in the Mexican bottled water market, 
this chapter describes in detail the investments in Mexico of two industry leaders, 
Groupe Danone and The Coca-Cola Company, followed by an overview of the third 
place PespiCo. (Nestle has a smaller presence in Mexico but because of their position as 
the global leader in the bottled water industry they are described in detail in Appendix 
3).  
Danone controls 37.3 percent of the Mexican bottled water market,310 versus 
Coca-Cola’s 25.9 percent,311 and PepsiCo.’s 16.3 percent (see Table 1).312 In Table 1 the 
major actors in the Mexican bottled water industry are ranked by market share and 
estimated sales in Mexico based on their share of the estimated $13 to $15 billion dollar 
industry. Table 1 also lists each firm’s global revenues. Danone, Coke and PepsiCo. 
together control approximately 80 percent of the bottled water distribution in Mexico. 
The remaining 20 percent of the market is shared by Nestle and the Dr. Pepper Group 
along with more than 8,000 small operators currently registered with the Mexican 
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federal government.313 “[This] is a business model that is emerging in megacities across 
the developing world. Rich people pay a premium for branded jugs that can be refilled 
from companies owned by multinational corporations [while] in working-class 
neighborhoods, local entrepreneurs fill the demand.”314 
 
 













Water Sales  




1	   37.5	   $37	   $4.0-$5.6	  
Coca-Cola/ 
FEMSA 2	   25.9	   $48	   $3.4-$3.9	  
PepsiCo. 
	  
3	   17.5	   $65.5	   $2.3-$2.6	  
Nestlé 
	  
4	   ≤ 5	   $98	   ≤ $1	  
Source: all numbers compiled from company annual reports; Lucero, Ramiro, “Sube precio de agua 
envasada,” El Universal, May 11, 2011; Castrano, Ivan, “Mexico’s Water War,” Forbes, March 12, 
2012, and Silvia, Olvera, “Inundan mercado aguas embotelladas,” El Norte, Aug. 9, 2012.  
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Danone, known as Dannon in the US, grew into a bottled water giant through a 
circuitous route. Danone, the world’s largest yogurt company, began in 1919 in Spain. 
In 1972 Danone merged with BSN, the owner of Evian and two other bottled waters to 
become France’s number one bottled water company. After a series of mergers with 
dairy, nut, biscuit, nutrition and water companies they became Groupe Danone. In 1992 
they bought Perrier’s Volvic mineral water company and became the top global seller of 
noncarbonated mineral water.315 In 1996 Danone bought the Chinese bottled water 
Wahaha, the number one brand in China, while India and Africa represent their targets 
of opportunity or territorial frontiers.316 After streamlining their business model, today 
they focus on dairy, bottled water, baby nutrition and medical nutrition.  
Danone entered the Mexican market in 1973 in a joint yogurt venture with Xalpa 
Industrial Company. They ended the deal with Xalpa and created Danone de Mexico in 
1987.317 In 1995 they acquired Bonafont, which today is Mexico’s number one selling 
bottled water. Because Danone has differentiated their waters as an upscale product in 
Mexico it commands a higher price and higher profits than the other leading bottled 
waters. 318 
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While ranked the top bottled water company in Mexico, Danone is the smallest 
in global sales. With 2012 global revenues of $37 billion, Danone is ranked #433 of the 
500 biggest global corporations.319 Danone is present in 143 countries and distributes 
dairy products, water and baby food. In 2012, bottled water represented about $6.6 
billion or 18 percent of their total revenue.320 On a global level, Danone ranks “No. 1 in 
worldwide fresh dairy products;” “No. 1 in water sales in Latin America, Asia Pacific, 
the Middle East and Africa;” and “No. 2 in water sales in Europe.”321 They also rank 
number one in baby nutrition in Europe. Rather than seek market share, Danone’s 
current campaign is metropolitan focused: Beijing, New York City, Moscow, Rio de 
Janeiro, and London. In line with Danone’s focus on baby nutrition and bottled water, in 
Mexico, they have launched a bottled water line for children: “perfect for tiny hands.”322  
Bottled water is increasingly important as Danone’s bottled water sector grew by 
10 percent per year in both 2011 and 2012.323 In 2013, bottled water sales in Mexico 
ranked second in importance for Danone while dairy remained number one. In the 
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countries where Danone is present, Mexico ranked seventh in sales volume, with 14,000 
employees and 33 production facilities.324 
Despite focusing less on European markets and more on emerging markets, 
Danone continues to be a French company with nationalistic tendencies.325 There have 
been several takeover attempts by larger food companies but the French government has 
defended Danone. “Numerous French politicians … stepped forward vowing to fight to 
keep the company in French hands.”326  While Danone is a decidedly French company 
with a highly diversified global presence, Mexico has assumed a growing importance.327  
Analysts at Danone, the owner of Evian, saw an opportunity in Mexico for an 
“aspirational” water with a widespread appeal. In 1995, they bought the Mexican bottled 
water company Bonafont with plans to develop the label. In 1994, Bonafont had 
$800,000 USD in sales.328 By 2007, 13 years later they had climbed to become the 
number one brand in Mexico. While Danone does not disaggregate their sales by region, 
they are the market leader in Mexico, controlling 37.3 percent of the Mexican $13-15 
billion USD market, equal to $4.8 - $5.6 billion in revenue. 
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Danone’s current strategy has been to market water as a solution to Mexico’s 
obesity epidemic. In addressing Mexican’s newfound appreciation for health issues, 
Danone advertises that consumers should drink two liters of bottled water a day to feel 
“lighter, hydrated and healthy.”329 “The heart of the Danone water’s strategy consists of 
360o brand activation and interaction with consumers.”330 In Mexico they promote a 
yearly 5k run in four of the nation’s biggest cities. In 2013, the company notes, 10 times 
as many people participated as when the company launched the initiative. Furthermore 
they created a specific 750ml water bottled that “is the “perfect size for runners,” in the 
hopes of creating an interactive brand experience.331 
Danone’s recent media campaigns have pushed into the social media spheres. 
Danone’s Evian Roller Babies ad campaign is considered one of the “most successful 
viral ad campaigns of all time.”332 Several of Evian’s babies on roller skates ads have 
been viewed voluntarily by more than 70 million viewers and their top three videos have 
over 200 million hits. 333 Their ads whisper, drink bottled water: “Live young.” 
Danone’s bottled water Evian is one of the important brands in the history of 
bottled water. For decades, even centuries, Evian was known as a medicinal mineral 
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water bottled in a small town in the French Alps. The Marquis of Lessert was reported to 
have been cured from an ailment after drinking this water on a daily walk in the late 
eighteenth century.334 French officials authorized the sale of the in glass bottles in 
1826.335 The water’s brand history claims that it originates from untouched melted snow 
and glacial sources.336 Since 1824 the small town has offered healing baths. In the early 
twentieth century the town of Evian opened the Evian Palace and Spa and became a 
trendy destination for the French and global elite.337 By the 1930s Evian branded 
themselves as water safe enough for babies and “after WWII European parents believed 
the minerals were good for breastfeeding mothers and babies.”338 In 1978, Evian “began 
being served in luxury restaurants and hotels in New York and Los Angeles.”339 The 
famed waters have enjoyed free publicity from celebrities such as Whitney Houston, 
Michael Jackson, and now Britney Spears, who reportedly bathe in the water.340 
Evian is important to the evolution of bottled water because the current bottled 
water industry has evolved from an elite conspicuous consumption item of the past. By 
referring to this history, Danone is able to capitalize on consumer’s fear of tap water 
with its squeaky clean image, even though its current bottled water business, which is 
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mostly in emerging markets, has nothing to do with Evian’s curative waters. This is why 
Danone’s brand Bonafont “is viewed as a more fashionable premium brand than [Coca-
Cola’s] Ciel.” Because of this they command a higher price earning profit margins “of 
around 18 percent.”341 
 
THE COCA-COLA COMPANY  
 
The Coca-Cola Company is the world’s largest beverage company. They serve 
one quarter of the world’s population, or 1.9 billion consumers, per day.342 The world’s 
208th biggest corporation,343 they are present in “over 200 countries,” and claim the 
worlds largest beverage distribution system.344 Since 1998, Mexico has led the world in 
per capita consumption of Coca-Cola products, and in 2010 Mexicans consumed an 
average of 675 servings per person year while the United States ranked fourth with 394 
(see Table 2).345 Coca-Cola brand Ciel has risen to take the number two rank in bottled 
water sales in Mexico.346 They are currently investing heavily in an attempt to control 
the market. 
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Table 2 shows that since 1998 Mexico has held the number one rank in per 
capita consumption of Coca-Cola product consumption. In 12 years consumption in 
Mexico grew by more than 50 percent while during that same period the US saw a 
stabilization and decrease in Coca-Cola product consumption. China has exhibited 425 
percent growth due to a low mean level of consumption. With steady growth and a large 
population China holds the greatest potential for future growth  
 
Table 2: Per capita Coca-Cola product consumption by Key Region 
Region 1998 2005 2008 2010 
China 
8 18 28 34 
Worldwide 
65 77 85 89 
United 
States 406 431 412 394 
Mexico 408 533 635 675 
Source: all numbers from Coca-Cola’s Ann. Rev. 2005, Ann. Rev. 2008, and Ann. Rev. 2010 
 
In Mexico, the Coca-Cola market is split between a subdivision of The Coca-
Cola Company, Coca-Cola Mexico, and Coca-Cola FEMSA, a partnership between The 
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Coca-Cola Company and Fomento Economico Mexicano S.A.B. de C.V. (FEMSA).347  
Coca-Cola FEMSA, which controls 50 percent of the Coca-Cola product distribution in 
Mexico is the second largest licensed Coca-Cola distributor in the world (The Coca-Cola 
Company is the first), as well as the world’s largest independent Coca-Cola bottler.348 In 
2013, both companies were among the biggest beverage firms in the world: The Coca-
Cola Company was the largest while FEMSA was fifth largest beverage bottler in the 
world.349 
FEMSA is a holding company that controls 48 percent of the joint Mexican 
company Coca-Cola FEMSA while The Coca-Cola Company owns 28 percent with 22 
percent of the company is publicly held.350 Coca-Cola Mexico, a subdivision of The 
Coca-Cola Company, along with Coca-Cola FEMSA controlled 25.9 percent351 of the 
bottled water market in Mexico while growing 19.9 percent in total sales from 2011 to 
2012.352  
While FEMSA is headquartered in Mexico, it is a transnational company. In 
2013, Coca-Cola FEMSA expanded to become the biggest Coca-Cola bottler in Brazil 
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and the Philippines, as well as Mexico.353 Both Coca-Cola Mexico and Coca-Cola 
FEMSA operate in the Mexican Coke and bottled water market. In 2012, Coca-Cola 
FEMSA had $11.3 billion in sales with 73,000 employees, operating in nine countries. 
Coca-Cola first registered as a brand in 1893 and had by 1930 created an 
international office and by 1950 had bottling operations in 45 countries. “By mid-
century, the company was the single largest buyer of sugar in the world, the biggest 
importer of licit coca leaves in the United States, and the largest consumer of processed 
caffeine on the planet.”354 Bartow Elmore argues that advertising played a key role to 
the success. However, its distribution system was the key to its success giving the 
company an unequaled “ability to place a real, tangible product on retail shelves across 
the globe.”355 Coca-Cola FEMSA currently boasts of 5,688 distribution routes through 
which their 50 products, from FANTA to Coke to various brands of water gain 
competitive access to shelf-space in every village with road access in Mexico.356 In 
many villages the only vehicles that regularly get in and out are the shiny red Coca-Cola 
trucks that arrive like clockwork.  
Coca-Cola began selling Coke in Mexico shortly after the Mexican Revolution 
began in 1914. By 1929 they were licensed to bottlers in Mexico City and 
                                                
353 FEMSA, Informe Anual, 2012: Construyendo sobre nuestras fortelezas, 2013. 
354 Elmore, Bartow, “Citizen Coke: An environmental and Political History of the Coca-Cola Company,” 
Enterprise and Socity, Dec. 2013, v14, n4: p718.  
355 Elmore, Bartow, “Citizen Coke: An environmental and Political History of the Coca-Cola Company,” 
Enterprise and Socity, Dec. 2013, v14, n4: p718.  
356 FEMSA, Informe Anual, 2012: Construyendo sobre nuestras fortelezas, 2013. 
 89 
Guadalajara.357 In 1941, Coca-Cola consolidated numerous regional bottlers and created 
Coca-Cola Mexico, the unique importer of the beverage maker’s concentrates.358 By 
1945 Coca-Cola Mexico had 28 bottling plants in Mexico.359 In the 1950s Coca-Cola 
Mexico built the only production facility making the Coca-Cola concentrate outside of 
the United States.360 
Coca-Cola has been marketing in partnership with the Mexican government for 
decades. Coca-Cola sponsors Mexican sports, including its the largest national sporting 
events; the 1965 Pan American Games; the 1968 Mexico City Summer Olympics; and 
the National Soccer Championships in the 1970s.361 Just as Coca-Cola in the United 
States became identified as an American product, in Mexico Coke became a Mexican 
product. In a widely circulated internet video Mexico’s Ex-president Vicente Fox tells a 
New York journalist why Mexican Coke is better than US Coke: “It’s the people,” Fox 
says, “We put our hearts into doing Coca-Cola in Mexico. So it’s sweeter and it’s 
greater.”362  
Coke’s success is at least in part explained by their strategy of supporting local 
as well as national clubs and sports teams throughout the world.  
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“Coke has one of the largest advertising budgets in the world, spending 
about $3.3 billion each year promoting its beverage portfolio, a sum that 
represents 33 percent of net profits. The company has spared no expense 
painting its signature logo on the facades of mom-and-pop shops, 
distributing cups at baseball games, or sponsoring local festivals and 
parades. The goal, as Coke’s marketing team well understood, was to 
create connections between Coke and things people liked.”363 
  
After Coke entered the Mexican bottled water market in 1999, they applied 
marketing learned from other products. At the time Coca-Cola Mexico was already 
testing markets in six states with their water Ciel. In less than 15 years Coca-Cola has 
taken Ciel from non-existent to a $3.4 to $3.9 billion brand (see Table 2). 
“The company has been successful, many have argued, because it is a ‘want 
maker,’ a company that has been successful at persuading people to buy its non-essential 
products.”364 When they began selling water, Coke officials were aware that it would be 
easy to steal their product. Filtered water could be easily reproduced and Coca-Cola 
needed a way to guarantee the authenticity of the Coke product.365 The problem was 
resolved in 1999: each bottle of water would include a packet of minerals and flavors.366 
This would give their water a differentiated taste – impossible to replicate. Bottlers 
would be beholden to the company. 
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According to Bartow Elmore’s 2012 dissertation, water and water filtration have 
been at the core of The Coca-Cola Company’s business model since the beginning. It 
was Coca-Cola’s water team in the 1930s that first experimented with carbon filtration 
technology to de-chlorinate tap water for use at the company’s bottling plants then 
spreading across the country.367 Coke was also experienced in stepping in when public 
water systems were contaminated and undrinkable. In 1960 when an oil refinery in New 
Orleans contaminated the city’s water “the local Coca-Cola bottler secured a fleet of 
tankers and imported spring water.”368 As early as the 1970s Coke’s management 
understood that the water market was opening on the opportunities presented by a 
crumbling public water infrastructure. “In 1971 CEO C.A. Shillinglaw supported 
experimentation in bottled water considering ‘the future quality of the public water 
supplies will continue to deteriorate, thereby generating for bottled water an increasing 
physical quality advantage.”369 After the introduction of Dasani, Coke promoted a 
restaurant campaign “Just say no to H2O,” with the stated goal of teaching servers 
techniques to steer customers away from tap water.370 
Globally Coca-Cola already has 53.1 percent of the carbonated beverage market. 
In the struggle to capitalize on the coming water shortages, they have announced plans 
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to invest throughout the developing world.371 Mexico and Brazil represent their biggest 
investments while China, India, the Middle East, Russia and Africa are close behind. 
Coca-Cola’s current strategy is to become the number one brand in Mexico.372 Today 
Coca-Cola Mexico has eight brands of bottled water in Mexico: Ciel Purificada, Ciel+, 
Ciel Mineralizada, Ciel Mini, Smart Water, Victoria, Acueducto, and Cristal. They have 
announced plans to double sales by 2020 by investing $1 billion per year, expanding 
their market, and “stepping on Bonafont’s toes.”373 This announcement was coupled 
with the unveiling of their newest product, the 350ml bottle, perfect for children.374 In 
November of 2013, Coca-Cola FEMSA sold bonds in the successful attempt to raise 
$2.1 billion, announcing they will use this money to invest in water treatment and 
bottling facilities.375 They are playing to win, as Coca-Cola’s bottled water Ciel, whose 
mantra is Eso que te mueve [It’s what moves you], will get a third of the investment 
budget.376 
One element of Coke’s success has been an ability to partner with the public 
sector. Elmore argues that Coke’s historical reliance on public water systems has 
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allowed them to save on costs.377 Furthermore, Coke was able to receive foreign 
assistance loans. “As Coke looked to build bottling plants in international markets, it 
secured federal development aid for these projects.”378 In the 1970s Coke argued that it 
could help the world by bringing “hydration to communities lacking basic water 
infrastructure abroad.”379 These loans have “helped Coke sell bottled water and other 
products.”380 
Coca-Cola FEMSA is a special case in Mexico because of the close relation the 
company has enjoyed with Mexico’s political system. While Coke has always “relied on 
a host of private and public partners to generate the raw materials it needed,” in Mexico 
it has enjoyed a special “presidential” relationship.381 In Mexico the rise of Coca-Cola’s 
bottled water industry occurred in parallel to the rise of the administration of President 
Vicente Fox Quesada (2000-2006). President Fox was the CEO of Coca-Cola FEMSA 
before becoming president. Coca-Cola FEMSA was entering the bottled water market 
when Fox’s administration began. Fox agreed with the idea that a private sector firm 
could provide better services to a consumer than the public sector (See page 112 for a 
discussion of Fox). For example, while in office he oversaw a $250 million World Bank 
program, PROMAGUA, which assisted in the privatization of municipal water 
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systems.382 His promotion of the privatization of the water industry was based on his 
experiences at Coca-Cola Mexico where he rose from route manager to become its 
youngest CEO in history.383 
The relationship between Coca-Cola and the leaders of Mexico is part of what 
Elmore describes as Coke’s game plan. Elmore argues that Coke was able to grow not 
just by taking advantage of the overproduction of natural resources like aluminum and 
sugar, but also by encouraging government policies that produced these surpluses. 
Unlike other giant food distributors such as Hersey’s, Coke did not vertically integrate 
their business model by buying up suppliers.384 Elmore argues that this gave Coca-Cola 
advantages during booms and busts and allowed them to play their suppliers against on 
one another. Coke “accumulated wealth by facilitating the transfer of natural resources 
from overproducing suppliers to commercial retailers while minimizing financial 
commitments in extractive and distribution infrastructure.”385 
As Coca-Cola launches their massive capital investment campaign in Mexico, 
they have another advantage: raw water sources. Coca-Cola has a license to extract 29.5 
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In absolute size the U.S.-based PepsiCo, which owns Lays, Doritos, Cheetos and 
Quaker Oats, is a larger company than The Coca-Cola Company or the Danone Group. 
PepsiCo is 137th on the Fortune 500 list with $65.5b in sales.387 Pepsi once dominated 
the Mexican bottled water market in the early 2000s but lost share as Danone and Coca-
Cola moved into the home delivery sector, and now Pepsi controls 17.5 percent of the 
Mexican bottled water market. 388 Pepsi merged in 2011 and 2012 with several soft drink 
bottlers in Mexico. Forbes analysts believed that these mergers have left Pepsi too 
distracted to become Mexico’s top bottled water company.389 PepsiCo. other product 
lines and brands including Seven-Elevens and Starbucks continue to expand in 
Mexico.390 
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In 2012, Nestlé’s brand of water, Pure Life, became the world’s leading water. 391 
While Fortune 500 ranks Nestlé as the world’s 69th largest company, with $98 billion in 
sales and $11b in profits, Nestlé does not have much presence in the bottled water 
market in Mexico.392 While Nestlé’s accounts for less than 5 percent of the Mexican 
bottled water market they remain an important player in the global bottled water market. 




In the bottled water market in Mexico, there is fierce competition underway 
between some of the world’s biggest and most recognized beverage and food 
conglomerates. In the context in which Mexico rose to become the world’s largest 
bottled water market, it is useful to evaluate the facility of the players. The Coca-Cola 
Company, currently Mexico’s second largest bottled water company, has proven its 
capacity to develop delivery systems, secure water rights and political integration, and 
invest competitively. The larger companies, PepsiCo. and Nestle and even Danone, are 
equally agile. It is very likely that these companies will continue to dominate and 
expand the Mexican bottled water market for a long time to come.  
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The story of cholera, the earthquake and the financial crisis in Mexico made 
bottled water a necessity owing to a lack of clean water. Through advertising and 
operating in a highly competitive market, the bottled water firms influenced the 
industry’s success in Mexico. The next chapter will show how presidential politics and 
market reforms in Mexico also factored into the rise of the bottled water industry. 
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CHAPTER 5:  THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF MEXICO AND THE RISE OF THE 
BOTTLED WATER INDUSTRY 
  
Presidential politics and market reforms in Mexico created the conditions for the 
bottled water industry to thrive. Even though Mexico sought to decentralize its 
governance structure, beginning in the mid-1980s, it has remained a highly centralized 
country. This chapter will briefly discuss the presidential administrations from 1970 to 
the present as they have attempted to reform the public water sector. The reforms 
culminated with the Vicente Fox administration (2000-2006) which ensured that the 
bottled water market was open for business. Fox and his successors have appointed key 
bottled water industry insiders to the highest levels of Mexico’s water commission. 
The rise of the bottled water industry in Mexico occurred during a period of 
economic re-structuring of Mexico. Income and quality of life indicators rose from the 
1940s through the 1970s, while the political system under the Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional (PRI), which ruled Mexico continuously from 1929 through 2000, 
“remained highly authoritarian.”393 Mexico’s president serves a single six-year term, is 
the dominant political authority in the nation, “and has a strong influence on the 
reordering of bureaucratic domains.”394 “The Mexican president has the power to act as 
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a constituent power with the authority to amend the Constitution, to act as chief 
legislator, to establish himself as the ultimate authority in electoral matters, to assume 
jurisdiction in judicial matters, and to remove governors, municipal presidents, and 
legislators in the federal and state levels.”395  
Fundamental to an agricultural country like Mexico was control, allocation, and 
administration of the nation’s waters. Philippus Wester reports that it was in part through 
the expansion of irrigation and the centralization of water control that the PRI “managed 
to keep in check sharp socio-economic differences and increase its political control over 
the country.”396 For a century ending in 1975, control over water was increasingly 
centralized in what some called Mexico’s “hydrocracy” in reference to the consolidated 
political power of Mexico’s hydraulic engineers.397 In 1946, Mexico established the 
Secretaria de Recursos Hidraulicos (SRH: the Secretary of Hydraulic Resources), one of 
the best funded and most powerful federal agencies with the mission statement: Por la 
grandeza de Mexico [for the greatness of Mexico].398 “This was a period in which 
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Mexican development was linked to the expansion of irrigated agriculture.”399 Part of 
the focus of the agency was to support the industrialization “of the country by generating 
foreign exchange, both through the provision of cheap basic grains and the production of 
export crops.”400 The vision was that agricultural exports and income could be achieved 
through the expansion of the nation’s irrigation systems.  
PRESIDENT LUIS ECHEVERRIA ALVAREZ (1970-76)   
 
 Social unrest in the 1960s and the end of the economic stability and growth in 
the 1970s created openings for alternative political voices.401 A major spike in oil prices 
tempted leaders to spend freely to quell the uproar. President Echeverria (1970-76) 
began an expansion of the federal bureaucracy, and “developed social welfare programs 
that sought to integrate the poor classes as well as to weaken extraparliamentary 
opposition groups and social unrest.”402 As the government expanded, SRH became 
increasingly well financed and powerful, so much so that from the 1960s through the 
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1970s the agency became successful on its own in securing international loans. SRH 
provided the government access to “urgently needed foreign reserves.”403   
Under Echeverria the 1972 Ley Federal de Aguas consolidated all water 
infrastructure planning, construction, and development under SRH and prohibited local 
user management of water districts.404 Jose López-Portillo, who before becoming 
president, was the minister of finance under President Echeverria, tried to control the 
SRH but failed.405 In 1976, when he ran for president, key groups of “hydrocrats,” senior 
engineers who ran the SRH, supported his opponent.406 When he became president, 
Portillo ended the Ministry of Hydraulic Resources’ reign over Mexico. 
 
PRESIDENT JOSE LOPEZ PORTILLO (1976-1982) 
 
Jose Lopez Portillo sought to decentralize water administration as a key 
government goal by placing SRH under the control of the Ministry of Agriculture in 
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1976, putting the hydrologists under the agronomists.407 The plan was to reduce the 
power “of a network of hydrological engineers,” and change the country’s path to 
development.408  
Industry growth and agricultural outputs are dependent on access to water.409 
Even now, Mexico’s water consumption continues to be dominated by agricultural use. 
In 2000, Mexico’s agricultural sector accounted for 79 percent of the total water 
extraction while the industrial sector accounted for only 4 percent.410 Water policy in 
Mexico has been at the heart of the nation’s attempt to modernize, globalize and 
industrialize.411 During the boom years of the 1970s leaders began to envision a modern, 
globally integrated Mexico. “This was evident in the 1980s when the state embraced the 
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neoliberal model, acknowledging that the farming sector was no longer the country’s 
development generator nor a national priority.”412  
Meanwhile, in 1977, at the United Nations’ Water Resource Conference in Mar 
del Plata, Argentina, U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim warned that water had to 
be protected to avoid disastrous consequences of increased demand as populations 
grew.413 Future conferences would mark this as the beginning of the shift towards a 
market option as a solution to the water crisis.414 Garrett Hardin’s The Tragedy of the 
Commons (1968) began to make waves throughout the economics and environmental 
fields. According to some analysts, privatization and the establishment of transferable 
property rights will protect water resources.415 “The argument goes that consumers will 
use water more efficiently if they are made to pay per unit volume of water at cost-
reflective prices.”416 Others argue that privatization and commodification of public 
goods is less about resource protection than appropriation of resources and profits.417 
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PRESIDENT MIGUEL DE LA MADRID (1982-1988) 
 
President Miguel de la Madrid continued the decentralization of the federal 
government. He became president in the midst of an unfolding economic crisis. Funding 
for water projects was cut in half.418 “The World Bank stopped lending to Mexico.”419 
Mexico’s modernization project ground to a halt. De la Madrid, an economist, was torn 
between the needs of distressed Mexicans and the demands of the world financial 
institutions. De la Madrid “adopted a neoliberal approach that strongly departed from 
the populist and interventionist economic policies followed by previous presidents.”420 
He ordered all federal agencies to decentralize and gave municipal authorities 
responsibility for the management of drinking water systems.421 The 1985 earthquake 
destroyed the Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources offices.422 A year after 
the earthquakes, in 1986, De la Madrid created a National Institute for Water 
Technology, the Instituto Mexicano de Tecnologia del Agua (IMTA). IMTA’s mandate 
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was to “modernize water management and distribution” throughout Mexico.423 
According to one perspective, De la Madrid won the election by agreeing to bring the 
water engineers (the hydrocracy), back to power, but the financial crisis and the 
earthquakes physical destruction of federal buildings reduced his ability to reorganize 
the ministries.424 
CARLOS SALINAS GORTARI (1988-1994) 
 
Madrid’s successor Carlos Salinas Gortari (1988-1994) created the national 
water commission, (CONAGUA: Comisión Nacional de Agua) in 1989. Salinas also 
pushed an agenda aimed at reducing government spending through decentralization and 
sharing the responsibility for public water infrastructure through public-private-
partnerships (PPPs).425 The original intention was to organize the agency into six 
administrative river basin regions and thus diffuse its influence. CONAGUA’s charter 
charged it with two functions directly related to the rise of the bottled water industry: 
defining water policies and granting water concessions.426 
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CONAGUA set the stage for the major reforms in the water sector that were to 
come. Beset by the financial crisis and the destruction left by the earthquakes, 
CONAGUA published recommendations in 1989 to create a modern, functioning water 
management system. The report focused on the “substandard conditions of the water 
supply;” the low technical skill level of the nation’s professional water management 
staff; and “low levels of revenue collection.”427 CONAGUA recommended “increasing 
decentralization, autonomy, self-sufficiency, and private participation in the provision of 
water supply service.”428  This was enacted in 1992 as the National Water Law, pushed 
through by Salinas. The reform attempted to empower business-oriented municipio 
(county) level agencies to manage the water supply. CONAGUA also recommended that 
local water utilities begin to suspend service for uncollected tariffs.”429 Suspending 
water services in a country where water is seen as a constitutional right was radical. The 
1992 law delegated the states to carry out the reforms. By 1995, 80 percent of the 
country’s water resources, irrigation canals, and water districts were administered with 
what was essentially a business approach to the allocation of water. 430 
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Despite pushing for administration at the local level the new law also returned 
CONAGUA and the “hydrocracy” as “the country’s sole water authority.”431 This was 
what Victoria Rodriguez has called strengthening the center through decentralization.432 
The reforms added full-cost pricing mechanisms allowing CONAGUA to become 
financially independent. Regional and local water districts were granted water 
concessions by CONAGUA and then expected to collect fees for system maintenance. 
The new law allowed transferable water rights: “The water law sought to encourage 
water markets through the introduction of market mechanisms, pricing and other 
economic incentives to encourage more efficient use of water.”433  
In 1992 the International Conference on Water and the Environment (ICWE) in 
Dublin defined water as an economic good in its principle number four: “Water has an 
economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognized as an economic good. 
… Managing water as an economic good is an important way of achieving efficient and 
equitable use and of encouraging conservation and protection of water resources.”434 
This shift in strategy over water resource management was reinforced at the 1992 United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro, 
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Brazil. Michelle Haley has argued that ICWE and UNCED opened the door to the 
expansion of a private the bottled water industry. “The conferences in both Dublin and 
Rio … represent a fundamentally new way of dealing with global water issues. Now 
considered a commodity, the allocation, conservation and protection of freshwater 
resources would be optimized through free market mechanisms.”435  
Mexico’s 1992 National Water Law enabled the bottled water industry’s rise by 
allowing a transfer of water rights from the public sphere to the private sphere 
“permitted trading in water allocation rights.”436 This shift was intended to address both 
the absence of federal funding and the allocation of scarce water in a time of increasing 
demand. Under the new law, once water rights were allocated the federal government 
would prohibit drilling new wells. New users would have to purchase the rights from an 
existing water user.437 
The changes in the water sector reflected larger changes in Mexico’s economy. 
“In the 1990s while the role of the Mexican state was scaled back through the 
privatization and liberalization processes that eased the fiscal pressures, the private 
sector was playing a larger role in driving the capital markets.”438 The larger changes 
included: “economic reorganization; national market openness; elimination of 
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commercial barriers; privatization of public enterprises and state property;” and a 
“reduction of social policy expenses.”439 These reforms were intended to increase 
competition and improve efficiency and provide a downward pressure on prices.440 
At the end of the Salinas administration hundreds of state owned enterprises 
were sold or closed. “By June of 1992, the Mexican government had privatized 361 out 
of approximately 1,200 enterprises … By 1993 only 213 remained in state hands.”441 In 
the water sector these reforms meant an increased reliance on the private sector.  
PRESIDENT ERNESTO ZEDILLO (1994-2000) 
 
Ernesto Zedillo was the last president of the PRI’s 71-year single party rule over 
Mexico. Of the 416 constitutional reforms passed between 1917 and 2004, Zedillo 
passed 76 (18 percent), reflecting both his activism and his political agility.442 Water 
policy was central to Zedillo’s reforms, as CONAGUA was moved out of the 
department of agriculture (SARH) and into the national environment agency 
(SEMARNAP).443 As with reforms under Salinas, the changes under Zedillo were also 
intended to strengthen the center while decentralizing. State water commissions were 
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empowered but final decisions and project financing continued to emanate from 
CONAGUA’s central office.444 “Between 1995 and 2000, the centralising tendencies in 
the hydrocracy were very strong and proved stronger than the policy current in 
[CONAGUA] aiming for decentralised water management.”445 Publicly criticized by the 
state governments and water users increasingly discredited CONAGUA.446 “With the 
election of a non-PRI president in 2000, hopes were high that ‘deep’ institutional change 
would occur in the water sector.”447 
PRESIDENT VICENTE FOX QUESADA (2000-2006) 
 
President Vicente Fox continued to integrate Mexican markets into the global 
economy. Fox, the CEO of Coca-Cola Mexico prior to becoming president, truly 
believed in the private sector’s ability to deliver services. He intended to run Mexico 
like a business and in that respect, his ascendancy to power resulted in “a direct, 
immediate switch to managerial power.”448 Political power in Mexico was committed to 
the interests of “transnational capitalism exercising a new governance strategy. This 
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strategy allowed them to dominate and directly control the means for achieving their 
maximum benefit.”449  
Philippus Wester reported that President Vicente Fox was unable to accomplish 
much during his administration.450 It was the first presidency since 1929 that was not 
from the PRI party. During Fox’s term the PRI still controlled important loyalties 
embedded deep within the state bureaucracy and in the Senate and Congress. Meeting 
the water infrastructure needs of the nation continued to require investments and faith in 
public water systems was decreasing.451 In 2002, CONAGUA reported they needed $1.8 
billion (USD 2002) to upgrade and maintain the nation’s water infrastructure.452 That 
year the Mexican congress only approved $1 billion, a shortfall of 44 percent.453  
From the bottled water industry’s vantage, the Fox presidency was effective. 
Coca-Cola’s bottled water sales in Mexico during the Fox administration provide an 
illustration of how private and public interests lined up to aid the rise of the bottled 
water industry. In 2002, Coca Cola Company’s Annual Report forecasted: “over the next 
ten years, bottled water is expected to become the world’s largest beverage category.”454 
In one year, from 2002 to 2003, Coca-Cola FEMSA reported a 96 percent compound 
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annual rate of growth (CARG), as revenues doubled from $2 billion to $4 billion, while 
the Coca-Cola bottled water brand Ciel grew by 48 percent.455 Throughout Fox’s 
presidency Coca-Cola FEMSA’s revenues would triple.456 Mexico accounted for 44 
percent of Coca-Cola FEMSA’s geographical domain in Latin America and Southeast 
Asia, Mexico had the strongest and fastest growing sector, exhibiting “a strong platform 
for future competitiveness.”457 During Fox’s administration Mexico would be come the 
number one per capita consumer of Coca-Cola products in the world surpassing the next 
consumers: Malta, Chile and The United States (see Table 2).  
The legend of Vicente “The Coca-Cola Kid” Fox is that he grew up in a rancho, 
which in Mexico is a small rural village. He campaigned as the only candidate to have 
ever milked a cow.458 While that was part of his marketing savvy, Fox was no hayseed, 
but the son of a wealthy farmer who raised cattle, ostriches and crops for export.459 
Another legend, says that Fox is a Harvard-educated businessman.460 As a marketing 
king Fox knew how to spin a story; when he ran for president Fox found it easier to 
direct the press’ imagination than to correct the many fanciful tales. Stories abound of 
his attending Harvard but Harvard has no record of his matriculation; the Chicago 
Tribune reported that the confusion stems from his attendance at a weeklong Coca-Cola 
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sponsored event at Harvard.461 Another legend paints him as working at Coca-Cola as a 
young boy delivering Coke’s to rural villages or corner stores in the big cities.462 Fox 
claims that he has seen more of Mexico than most, having travelled every delivery route 
of the company in the country.463 More realistically, he went off to college where he 
studied business and went to work for Coca-Cola Mexico where he joined as a route 
supervisor and says he rode every one of the company’s 2,500 routes at that time.464 By 
1979 Fox had risen within the corporate structure of Coca-Cola to become the president 
of Coca-Cola Mexico.  
Fox was a Coca-Cola man.465 After his election his first appointment to head 
CONAGUA was another former Coca-Cola CEO, Cristobal Jaime Jaquez.466 Both men 
clearly believed the way forward in the water sector was through public-private-
partnerships.467 Fox and Jaime introduced PROMAGUA, a program financed by $250 
million from the World Bank to finance the privatization of the country’s water 
resources.468 Under the program PROMAGUA would provide public financing of 20 
                                                
461 Correction, “Corrections,” Chicago Tribune, Jan. 25, 2001. 
462 Milner, Kate, “Profile:Vicente Fox,” BBC News, July 3, 2000. 
463 Milner, Kate, “Profile:Vicente Fox,” BBC News, July 3, 2000. 
464 Dadilla, Xardiel, “Frente a frente: Vicente Fox Quesada ‘Hay que ser transparente,” El Norte, May 
31, 1995. 
465Blanding, Michael, The Coke Machine: The Dirty Truth Behind the World’s Favorite Soft Drink,” 
Penguin Group, New York, 2010. 
466 Wester, Philippus, Rap, Edwin, and Sergio Vargas-Velazquez, “The hydraulic mission and the 
Mexican hydrocracy: Regulating and reforming the flows of water and power,” Water Alternatives, 
2009, v2 n3, p409; Moreno, Daniel, “Ofrece nueva gestion desterrar el espionaje,” El Norte, Nov. 28, 
2000. 
467 Castro, Claudia Reyna, “Urgen a Mexico nuevas inversiones en infraestructura del agua,” 
NoticiasFinancieras, Feb. 2, 2006.    
468 OECD, OECD Studies on Water: Making Water Reform Happen in Mexico, OECD Publishing, Jan. 
8, 2013. 
 114 
percent to 49 percent of the initial investment cost depending on the efficiency of the 
operation.469 Large international water management firms such as Vivendi and Suez 
invested heavily in the Mexican water system management. Ninety percent of Mexico’s 
largest urban centers shifted from public utilities to private management of water 
resources at that time.470 Yet, because of financial instability and the persistent problem 
of low levels of tariff collection, the world’s private water management companies were 
reevaluating investments in the developing world.471   
According to Global Water Intelligence, Mexico between 2000 and 2006, was a 
risky market for the private sector.472 Mexican water tariffs are set by populist criteria, 
decided at the municipal level, making it politically expensive for local governments to 
enact price increases. The national association of water and sanitation businesses, 
ANEAS estimated that in 2004, the entire water sector required additional investments 
of more than $2 billion per year for 25 years to provide Mexico with clean drinking 
water and treat the nation’s sewage.473 At that time Mexico federal funding for the water 
sector was at a the historically high level: $1 billion. This discrepancy between needs 
and funds led CONAGUA Director Cristobal Jaime Jaquez to state: “Making resources 
sustainable to strengthen the water sector cannot be done by good will alone. We need 
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capital and that must come from outside the government.”474 Mexico’s water 
infrastructure was in need of investment and while the World Bank and private 
companies were willing to take the risk, these were tough, vulnerable, and risky markets.  
Water pricing, or cost-recovery, is essentially a political issue. 475  
“The benefits are not fully recognised, therefore funds are difficult to 
mobilise, resulting in lower than needed investments and inadequate 
maintenance of infrastructure and in the difficulty of attracting good 
quality resources to the water sector … This in turn results in low quality 
services, which reinforces the cycle by further reducing their value in the 
eyes of users and governments.”476  
  
In Mexico the privatization of water management met with mixed results. 
Despite the fact that 90 percent of households were connected to a public water supply, 
in 2004, only 52 percent of households had a water meter.477 Water and wastewater bills, 
excluding bottled water, as a share of average net disposable income is only 0.2 percent 
in Mexico, which is among the lowest of the OECD countries.478 The United States, 
with a much high disposable income, pays 0.3 percent towards water and wastewater 
while France and the United Kingdom spend 0.7 percent of disposable income.479 While 
this is affordable for Mexican households it is not enough money to maintain or expand 
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the public water system. In this context, the private firms that sought to manage 
Mexico’s waters encountered difficulties and were unable to expand. “High capital 
intensity, large initial outlays, long payback periods, immobility and invisibility of 
assets, and low rates of return generate high risks. These factors … constitute important 
constraints on private sector participation in water and sanitation infrastructure.”480 
The bottled water industry however, was able to avoid the greatest of these risks: 
high capital costs for the water distribution systems. Without investing in infrastructure 
and by selling directly to consumers without having to publicly negotiate rates, the 
bottled water industry proved to be the profitable way forward. OECD estimates that 
infrastructure maintenance and investment represents 85 percent of the cost of providing 
water.481 The bottled water industry is able to avoid most of the costs of production and 
charge hundreds, even thousands of times the public per-unit water price (see Appendix 
2). Household tap water in Mexico currently averages $0.69 per 1,000 liters.482 The most 
expensive one liter bottle of Evian or Fiji water at a Mexican convenient store costs 
approximately $2, or 2,890 times as expensive. The bottled water industry’s argument is 
that the risks and probability of illness associated with drinking contaminated tap water 
may make this price difference justifiable to a consumer. 
In 2004, the Fox administration and the Senate passed sweeping reforms 
attempting once again to decentralize the nation’s water management. The 2004 reform 
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would give autonomy to 13 regional CONAGUA offices.483 The reform would delegate 
water management into the hands of local governments and users. The law specified that 
CONAGUA offices would be subordinated to the local watershed authorities. The only 
catch: CONAGUA never published the regulations regarding implementation of the 
2004 water law.484  
Meanwhile, at least in Chiapas and Jalisco, locally contested water concessions 
were given at low or no cost to the bottled water industry. Coca-Cola’s right to extract 
unlimited water from indigenous sources in Chiapas spawned protests and media 
attention.485 “In the 2000s, for example, the Mexican government proved particularly 
willing to grant Coke attractive tax breaks as it looked to expand in the interior of the 
country … [In Chiapas] Fox oversaw a permit that allowed a Coca-Cola bottler to 
extract at virtually no cost.”486  
In 2003, Carlos Ahumada, the director of the newspaper El Diario Independiente, 
published a series of articles alleging water concessions had been inappropriately given 
to Fox’s campaign supporters, “Los Amigos,” some of them Coca-Cola executives.487 
The articles alleged that Fox granted concessions to extract unlimited quantities of the 
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nation’s best groundwater.488 Ahumada was imprisoned the following year on unrelated 
charges that elevated the scandal of alleged presidential wrongdoing.489 
Meanwhile, behind “the explosive growth both of the bottled water market and 
the underground bottled water distribution was the simplification of the business 
registration during the Fox administration.”490 The process was streamlined and “instead 
of a long bureaucratic process, bottled water businesses only had to register on the 
internet to be legal.”491  
The number of bottled water distributors doubled during the Fox 
administration.492 In 1985 there were 35 bottled water companies organized under the 
bottled water industry association, the Asociacion de Productores y Distribuidores de 
Agua Purificada (ANPDAPAC).493 By 1998 there would be 3,500, registered with the 
federal government494 and by 2006, 6,000.495 ANPDAPAC reported that less than 1,000 
were legitimate. Unregulated informal distributors were likely refilling brand-named 
bottles from unreliable sources, re-using bottles without the capability to properly clean 
them between uses, and unable to keep up with the maintenance of their own filters.496 
An official study conducted by the federal health agency found 15 percent of 22,616 
                                                
488 Castro Soto, Gustavo, “Agua y Economia: La Coca-Cola en Mexico el Agua Tiembla,” Agua.org.mx, 
April 27, 2005.  
489 Castro Soto, Gustavo, “Agua y Economia: La Coca-Cola en Mexico el Agua Tiembla,” Agua.org.mx, 
April 27, 2005. 
490 Ramirez, Zacarias, “Empresas buscan fijar una norma para regular venta de agua embotellada,” 
Noticias Financieras, Jan. 24, 2012. 
491 Ramirez, Zacarias, “Empresas buscan fijar una norma para regular venta de agua embotellada,” 
Noticias Financieras, Jan. 24, 2012. 
492 Silvia, Olvera, “Inundan mercado aguas embotelladas,” El Norte, Aug. 9, 2012. 
493 Lara, Juan Antonio, “Logran sobrellevar crisis embotelladores de agua,” El Norte, Aug. 5, 1996. 
494 Rendon, Hector, “Encabezan 5 gigantes al sector,” Reforma, Sept. 2, 1998. 
495 Silvia, Olvera, “Inundan mercado aguas embotelladas,” El Norte, Aug. 9, 2012. 
496 Silvia, Olvera, “Informalidad: El enemigo a vencer,” El Norte, Aug. 19, 2010. 
 119 
samples of bottled water and ice made of purified water to be contaminated with fecal 
coliform.497 Other studies have shown that contaminated bottled water continues to be 
sold in Mexico. One study of 265 samples from 39 different brands in Mexico City 
showed that only 13 of the brands met bacteriological parameters for public drinking 
water suppliers, as established in official Mexican standards (NOM-041-SSA1-1993).498 
(Mexican law does not require bottled water firms to document how their water meets 
Mexican drinking water standards.) 
Partially because of the unreliability of the cheaper brands, Danone, Coke and 
Pepsi continued to expand. Some consumers report going directly to the Coca-Cola 
factory to ensure they were buying treated water.499 Despite challenges, the bottled water 
industry prospered during the Fox administration. One report from the time stated the 
bottled water industry’s “growth in sales has been 10 percent per year and the margins 
are calculated at 30 percent of the price to the consumer.”500 As a symbol of the growing 
prominence of the bottled water industry to the Mexican economy, in 2002 the Bank of 
Mexico began to incorporate the price of bottled water in the price index used to 
calculate inflation.501  
At the end of FOX’S presidency, the Fourth World Forum on Water would be 
held in Mexico City in 2006. With the world’s leading water experts and business 
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groups were in attendance, Fox gave the keynote address calling the audience, “the ones 
who will best take care of our waters of tomorrow. … I extend my profound recognition 
to this international community that has kept their promise to open the road to a new era 
of justice and equity for those who care for water. … It is indispensible that from this 
group come the social and political leaders that passionately defend all of our planet’s 
water.”502  
The World Bank would issue strong warnings at the end of the Fox 
administration about Mexico’s private political capture.503 “While the transition to 
democratic governance is underway in Mexico, a number of interest groups are 
mediating – and many times capturing – the relationship between the political leadership 
and the citizens in general (as voters), affecting the provision of public goods and 
services.”504 
FELIPE DE JESÚS CALDERÓN HINOJOSA (2006-2012) 
 
Mexico’s President Felipe Calderón continued Fox’s decentralization with the 
2004 National Water Law after he named a politician Jose Luis Luege-Tamargo to 
become the new head of CONAGUA. The appointment of a PAN politician with no 
background in water affairs as CONAGUA’s Director General was a rupture with the 
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hydrocracy tradition.505 CONAGUA’s staff fell from a peak of 34,000 employees in 
1989, to 14,000 in 2007.506 By the end of Calderón’s administration CONAGUA would 
have 13,000 staff members.507 Philippus reports that the change is further reflected by 
the fact that political operators have remained at CONAGUA while “more qualified 
water professionals” have left.508 These staffs change “implies a loss of power for the 
hydrocracy, the deterioration of [CONAGUA’s] position within the government and the 
decline of importance of water on the political agenda.509 Meanwhile bottled water 
continued to proliferate. 
Under Calderón bottled water sales doubled again, from an estimated $5.1 billion 
to $10 billion.510 The Mexican market grew to be number one globally in per capita 
consumption of bottled water and then in sales. As the overall market grew, competition 
to control it grew more serious. According to Euromonitor International, the higher 
profitability is in sales of the smaller unit size. The largest number of vendors sold large 
containers, garafons, while a smaller number of bigger players sold smaller bottles with 
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higher profits. As these companies increasingly achieve higher profits they buy up the 
competition.511 President Calderón had little influence on the bottled water market. 
During his administration the industry grew and the most profitable bottled water 
producers focused on smaller bottles. 
 
PRESIDENT ENRIQUE PEÑA NIETO (2012- ) 
  
While it remains to be seen how President Enrique Peña Nieto will deal with the 
provision of safe drinking water for Mexico’s citizens, he has signaled a continuation of 
the commodification path. Even before taking seat as president, Nieto appointed David 
Korenfeld to his transition team as a “water coordinator.”  Korenfeld had previously 
worked as the director of the bottled water industry association, ANEAS. As president, 
Nieto appointed Korenfeld director of CONAGUA.512 Further signaling the change, 
Korenfeld is now referred to in Mexican media as CONAGUA’s Chief Executive 
Officer.513 
In 2012, the Nieto administration and Korenfeld announced their intention to 
create a Secretaria del Agua.514 This would remove CONAGUA from the environmental 
agency where it now resides and once again return the administration of the nation’s 
water to center stage. They have further signaled plans for a new national water institute, 
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to include the study of the economics of water which the current national water institute 
is not charged to do.515 Nieto has acknowledged that while both of these changes are 
priorities, the reality of implementing them would involve a lengthy political process 
and as such, any description of the impact they would make is speculative.516 
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CHAPTER 6:  CONCLUSION 
  
This study has shown that a combination of factors in Mexico has facilitated 
bottled water as the preferred choice for potable water. Mexico’s per capita consumption 
of bottled water is the highest in the world and recent surveys show the consumption is 
much higher than previously estimated.517 Mexico illustrates how a private industry 
selling bottled water can profitably provide water in cases where capital intensive 
investments are unlikely because of social and economic factors. By avoiding the 
infrastructure expense of costly transmission and distribution systems, Mexico’s bottled 
water industry is able to forgo 85 percent of the costs typically incurred in the provision 
of drinking water.518  
The rise of the bottled water industry in Mexico reflects Mexico’s history. 
Mexican consumers have lost faith in the safety of the water distribution system. A 
combination of an earthquake, a cholera epidemic, multiple financial crises, advertising, 
political capture, and personal experience are all factors in Mexicans’ distrust in the 
water that is piped into their homes. While Mexicans collectively pay many times the 
unit-price for water, they choose to do this because of the lack of faith in their public 
water systems. In lower-income areas the portion of disposable household income spent 
on bottled water often far exceeds the 3-5 percent benchmark of affordability 
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recommended by the international financial institutions.519 Ironically, the bottled water 
they consume is often contaminated.520 Furthermore, as a society, even when 
investments to improve the public water system are made consumers continue to prefer 
brand name water. In January 2014, Mexico City passed an ordinance requiring 
restaurants to serve tap water to customers but early reports suggest that customers have 
refused to comply.521 “The majority of customers prefer bottled water,” the president of 
Mexico’s restaurant chamber stated.522 Evidence suggests that restoring faith in the 
public system may be difficult. Once the bottled water industry becomes established it 
may be entrenched; as noted above, “After having seen yellow water, brown water, 
people just don’t want to take the risk.”523  
The bottled water industry was able to find a market solution to the Mexican 
government’s failure to maintain, repair and adequately expand the nation’s drinking 
water system. Mexico’s bottled water industry may become a model for other nations 
with similar barriers to access safe water. As a collective choice it is an expensive model 
and without regulations and oversight. There are no regulations to guarantee that the 
water delivered through this model is safer. In order for consumers to determine if the 
choice they make is reasonable, mechanisms need to be in place to ensure that the public 
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has access to information about the quality of both tap water and bottled water quality. 
The choice to consume bottled water may be a personal choice, but as a society 
Mexicans are choosing to spend thousands of times more than if they invested in a 
centralized water system that provided safe and reliable water.  
This study was undertaken with the intent document factors that allowed the 
bottled water industry in Mexico to become the largest in the world. While this study has 
achieved its intent, there remain a number of important questions. If Mexico’s bottled 
water industry offers a model of water provision in an era of scarcity, what are the 
implications? Will increased consumption of bottled water result in even less 
willingness to pay for water and waste water infrastructure in developing nations? Can 
the bottled water industry thrive or even survive in a context where public water 
infrastructure is continuously improving or where ambient water quality in the 
environment is being restored? How will the bottled industry respond to different 
circumstances around the world? The bottled water industry and privatization advocates 
insist that there will be measures to ensure access by the poor to a minimum level of 
services, even if they can not pay for better water, however, are there bottled water 
industry responsibilities towards Mexico’s poor? How will those assurances occur and 
how will they be subsidized, by whom, and with what resources?  
Can public water services learn anything from the several decades of 
development of the bottled water industry? What lessons are there about consumer 
preferences and fears? Given the circumstances, public water works can provide water at 
1/1000th of the cost, yet they are losing customers! Is it possible for a public water sector 
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to provide the level of service and confidence that bottled water companies provide? It 
would be useful to compare the bottled water industry’s strategies in regions where 
functioning water utilities reliably provide high quality drinking water. How would 
consumer preferences stack up between Mexican’s who only drink bottled water, against 
consumer preferences in nations with the most advanced, expensive, centralized water 
systems?    
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Appendix 1: Mexico’s Bottled Water Industry By the Numbers. 
The bottled water market in Mexico differs significantly from the bottled water 
market in the United States  (see Table 3).524 The biggest difference is how the water is 
sold. In Mexico and throughout Latin America, the majority of sales (70 percent) are 
delivered to the home in 19 or 20 liter containers called garafons.  
Table 3: Latin America Bottled Water Market by Volume 
 Single Use Containers Bulk Size/ Garafons  
Mexico 30% 70% 
United States 88% 12% 
Source: Zenith International Ltd, 2006, International Bottled Water Association 
 
Another significant difference is that in Mexico there is a lack of trust in the 
public tap water delivery system. In a survey carried out by the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) in 2010 in Mexico, only 19 percent of respondents reported 
consuming tap water (see Table 4). Of those who do not drink tap water, 81 percent 
drink bottled water (see Table 5). This estimate implies that 66 percent of Mexicans use 
bottled water. Of Mexico’s 2013 estimated population of 118 million this is equal 76.7 
million bottled water consumers in Mexico who report they use bottled water for their 
daily drinking water. Eleven percent, or 13 million consumers bath their children in 
bottled water. 
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Table 4: IDB Mexican bottled water consumption survey: how do you use tap water? 
Do you use water “straight from the tap” to … 
 Yes No 
Bathe yourself 98% 2% 
Wash dishes 96% 4% 
Bathe infants 89% 11% 
Brush teeth 84% 16% 
Wash fruits/veggies 76% 24% 
Cook 54% 46% 
Drink 19% 81% 
Source: Latin America’s Other Water Infrastructure, Inter-American Development Bank, Nov. 10, 2011 
 
Table 5: IDB Mexican bottled water consumption survey: How do you obtain drinking 
water? 
If you don’t drink tap how do you obtain drinking water? 
Response  Survey Says 
Buy bottled water 81% 
Boil it 7% 
Disinfect it  2% 
Filter it 8% 
No response 2% 




There is significant regional variation in the survey (see Tables 6 and 7). The few 
regions in Mexico with reputable water systems report lower bottled water usage. In 
Monterrey for example, while 90 percent report believing tap water is safe (see Table 6), 
60 percent report drinking it (see Table 7). While in Monterrey, 100 percent of the 
people surveyed reported using tap water for cooking in other regions close to 75 
percent of the surveyed population reports not using it to cook with. In Tampico 29 
percent reported that they do not even bath their babies with tap water!  
Table 6:  IDB Mexican bottled water consumption survey: Is tap water safe to drink? 
Do you think tap water is safe to drink? 
Location Yes No 
Queretara 51 49 
Mexico City 37 62 
Tampico 26 73 
Chihuahua 82 17 
Monterrey 90 10 
Guadalajara 12 87 
Xalapa 19 81 
Villahermosa 8 92 
Tuxtla Gutierrez 18 82 
   
Source: Latin America’s Other Water Infrastructure, Inter-American Development Bank, Nov. 10, 2011 
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Table 7:  IDB survey: Tap water consumption by region 
Do you use the tap water to drink? 
Location Yes No 
Queretara 14 86 
Mexico City 17 83 
Monterrey 60 40 
Tampico 5 95 
Chihuahua 50 50 
Guadalajara 1 99 
Xalapa 1 99 
Villahermosa 0 100 
Tuxtla Gutierrez 2 98 
Total 19 81 
Source: Reporte Grafico Ejecutivo, report from Estudio sobre Agua Embotellada en Mexico, Inter-
American Development Bank, Feb. 2010. 
 
The difference between Table 6, “do you think tap water is safe?,” and Table 7 
“do you use tap water to drink?” is significant. In the same survey, 37 percent of people 
in Mexico City report that tap water is safe, while only 17 percent report drinking it. In 
Guadalajara, 12 percent believe it is safe but only 1 percent drink it. Even in Chihuahua 
where 82 percent of the respondents report believing it is safe, only 50 percent drink it.  
Table 4 shows that nationwide 11 percent report not using tap water to bathe 
their babies, an estimated 24 percent do not use tap water to wash fruits and vegetables, 
and 46 percent do not use it for cooking. Showing the variation by region, in Monterrey 
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only 3 percent do not use the tap water to wash their fruits and vegetables while in 
Villahermosa that figure is 40 percent. Of those who purchase bottled water, 100 percent 
use it for drinking, 49 percent use it for cooking, 18 percent use if to brush their teeth 
and 11 percent use it to bathe babies (see Table 4).  
Table 8:  IDB Mexican bottled water consumption survey: Average expenditures 
Average monthly water expenditures (USD) 
Location Bottled water 
Water and Sanitation 
Service Bill 
Queretara $8 $21 
Mexico City $10   $4 
Tampico $9 $20 
Chihuahua $6 $27 
Monterrey $6 $13 
Guadalajara $12 $18 
Xalapa $11 $22 
Villahermosa $15 $3 
Tuxtla Gutierrez $14 $15 
Average $11 $17 
Source: Latin America’s Other Water Infrastructure, Inter-American Development Bank, Nov. 10, 2011 
 
When it comes to household spending on bottled water the responses varied by 
region (see Table 8). Respondents from Mexico City reported only spending $4 per 
month on water and sanitation provided by the water utility, while spending $10 per 
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month on bottled water. By comparing Table 8 and Table 6, the relationship between 
low quality tap water and low monthly payments is obvious. In Chihuahua water bills 
paid to the utility are much higher, $27 per month, but consumer confidence in the 
safety of the tap water is 82 percent. Mexico City residents pay very little for what is 
perceived to be low quality tap water while residents in Chihuahua pay much more for 
higher quality service. Villahermosa respondents reported only spending $3 per month 
on tap water and sanitation services, while 92% reported believing their water is not 
safe. Monterrey is the exception to the rule as residents there report spending only $13 
per month on tap water and sanitation services while 90 percent believe it is safe to 
drink. Regions that report paying the most for tap water also report having the least faith 
in their tap water.  
Table 9:  IDB Mexican bottled water consumption survey: Garafons per week. 
Numbers of garafons per week 
1 to 4 38% 
5 to 8 34% 
9 to 12 15% 
13+  13% 
Source: Latin America’s Other Water Infrastructure, Inter-American Development Bank, Nov. 10, 2011 
 
The average price paid for a garafon was $19 pesos with a range of 4 pesos to 
more than 30 pesos per garafon. Nationally, the average household purchased 5.77 
garafons per month. Spending averaged $132 pesos ($10 USD) per month or $1584 
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pesos ($120 USD) per year, which when multiplied by the population of 118 million 
represents an estimated industry with $14 billion revenues in 2010.  
Thirty-eight percent reported purchasing 1 to 4 garafons per week and 34 percent 
purchased 5 to 8 garafons per week while 15 percent purchased 9 to 12 garfons per week 
and 13 percent purchased more than 13 (see Table 9). When asked about consumption of 
bottled water habits an average of 80 percent reported having purchased bottled water in 
the past four weeks. All of the respondents in Villahermosa and 90 percent or more in 
Guadalajara, Tuxtla, Xalapa and Tampico report purchasing bottled water in the past 
four weeks. Only 30 percent in Chihuahua and 55 percent in Monterrey report the same. 
Of those who reported purchasing bottled water, 78 percent purchased the bulk sized 
19L garafons and 18 percent reported purchasing both garafons and smaller bottles of 
water.  
 This study describes Mexico with a larger bottled water consumption than 
previously estimated. The national per capita monthly consumption is 40L. The average 
consumption level, according to this IDB study is 154 L per month, (1848 L per year). 
The study’s final report states that the range of consumption was 228L to 840L per 
capita per year. While this study should be redone to confirm these results, the findings 
suggest that Mexico’s bottled water industry is at least twice the size previously 
estimated. Other published reports show that Mexico’s bottled water consumption was 
234 l per person in 2010 while this study shows that it is closer to 480 (see Appendix 2 
for a discussion on survey methodology).  
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The survey shows mixed results about how people have learned that their water 
is contaminated and how they’ve learned that bottled water is safe. Television, radio, 
official bulletins, advice from their doctors and communication with their neighbors and 
family all play equal roles. About 60 percent believe that the water contamination comes 
from the delivery system between the treatment plant and their home water tank. 
Another 19 percent believe that contamination occurs at the treatment plant and 17 
percent believe it gets contaminated at the home. Only 12 percent report that they or a 
family member have had diarrheal sickness attributed to drinking tap water. A quarter of 
the population report having heard public information campaigns stating that the tap 
water is of good quality while an equal number report having heard or read information 
about the risks of drinking tap water. More than half (54 percent) have heard or seen 
news or publicity touting the advantages of bottled water. The primary response people 
gave as to why they do not use tap water was that it is filthy (37 percent). Another 28 
percent report they do not have confidence in its quality.  
The same survey looked at civic trust in distinct levels of government service 
provision and respondents reported a general lack of trust in all levels of government. 
On a scale of 1 to 10, local and state governments averaged a ranking of 5 and the 
federal government a 6. The results varied by region with only 18 percent in Monterrey 
scoring the federal government poorly while 80 percent did in Tuxtla Gutierrez. Only 4 
percent of respondents in Mexico City ranked their municipal government as favorable 
(as measured by giving the government, on a scale of 10, a 9 or 10 out of 10). On 
average, more than 77 percent ranked their government as unsatisfactory.  
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This study commissioned by the IDB reports the penetration of Mexico’s bottled 
water industry through a survey carried out in 9 cities with a 1305 responses.525 The IDB 
commissioned a study to be conducted among the households that already have 
connections to the tap water system. The survey results were presented at the IDB 
headquarters in Washington D.C. at a conference titled “How Mexico Became the 
World’s Top Consumer of Bottled Water,” on Nov. 10, 2011. The bank reports: “The 
survey indicates that the consumption of bulk bottled water (in 20 liter containers) is far 
higher than previously estimated.” 
 
                                                
525 IDB, Latin America’s Other Water Infrastructure, Inter-American Development Bank, Nov. 10, 2011. 
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Appendix 2: Global Bottled Water Snapshot 
 
Table 10: Global bottled water consumption by top countries 2000-2010, 
 
 




Table 10 shows that Mexico is the world’s top bottled water consumer. Other per capita 
bottled water leaders such as Italy, United Arab Emirates, and Germany have fallen in 
consumption while Mexico’s has continued to grow. These numbers differ significantly 
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from the IDB survey (see Appendix 1) which show Mexico’s per capita consumption to 
be 480 liters per person per year. The difference can at least in part be explained by the 
IDB survey method of measuring consumption at the household level and the previous 
estimate by the International Bottled Water Association (IBWA) which measured 
reported sales. While more data needs to be gather to access the accuracy of the IDB 
survey, it appears a household survey is gathering data that the IBWA missed. This can 
be in part explained by the fact that in Mexico, a large but unknown portion of the 
bottled water industry is unaccounted for. 526 
                                                
526 Barrientos, Alberto, “Buscan Agua Purificado,” Reforma, March 22, 2007. 
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Appendix 3: Nestlé. 
Nestlé	   a	   Swiss	   company,	   is	   among	   the	   largest	   corporations	   in	   the	  world.527	   It	  
became	  famous	  in	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  because	  of	  their	  instant	  coffee	  Nescafe.	  As	  
they	   grew	   they	   steadily	   incorporated	   products	   and	   brands,	   becoming	   one	   of	   the	  
most	   prominent	   names	   in	   processed	   food	   on	   the	   planet.	   In	   1985	   they	  made	   the	  
biggest	  merger	  up	  to	  that	  time	  “outside	  the	  oil	  industry”	  by	  buying	  up	  Carnation.528	  
In	  1990,	  they	  joined	  up	  with	  General	  Mills.	  In	  the	  early	  1990s	  they	  looked	  into	  the	  
future	  and	  began	  acquiring	  water	  bottled	  water	  companies.	  	  
Nestlé’s	   history	   claims	   that	   their	   founder	   sold	   bottled	   water	   in	   1843.529	  
However,	  it	  was	  not	  until	  1992,	  with	  the	  purchase	  of	  The	  Perrier	  Group	  that	  Nestlé	  
entered	   the	  market	   on	   a	   global	   scale.	   Perrier	   had	   acquired	   a	   number	   of	   smaller,	  
cheaper	  brands	  of	  bottled	  water	  in	  the	  1980s,	  so	  after	  the	  Nestlé	  purchase	  they	  all	  
became	  the	  world’s	  largest	  bottled	  water	  company.	  
Perrier	  was	  a	  French	  water	  that	  became	  a	  status	  symbol	  in	  the	  1980s.	  “Thanks	  
to	  the	  marketing	  efforts	  of	  Nestlé	  Waters	  North	  America	  Inc,	  social	  drinkers	  started	  
ordering	  Perrier	  instead	  of	  a	  cocktail	  or	  soft	  drink,”	  the	  website	  Fine	  Bottled	  Waters	  
states.	   	   In	   1980,	   Perrier	   sold	   12	   million	   bottles	   and	   by	   1990	   they	   sold	   152	  
million.530	  “When	  you	  held	  a	  Perrier	  bottled	  up,	  it	  said	  something	  about	  yourself,	  it	  
                                                
527 “Reinventing Nestlé,” Investors Chronicle, July 11, 2013. 
528 “Reinventing Nestlé,” Investors Chronicle, July 11, 2013. 
529  Nestlé Waters, Nestlé Water’s Brandbook, 2012. 
530 Forsyth, Hamo, Bottled water has become liquid gold, BBC Business, Nov. 22, 2010. 
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said	  you	  were	  sophisticated,	  you	  …	  understood	  what	  was	  happening	  in	  the	  world,”	  
Beverage	   Marketing	   Corporation	   Chairman	   Michael	   Bellas	   explained.531	   News	  
articles	   from	  the	  period	  describe	  high	  demand	  for	  Perrier	  and	  others	  such	  as	  San	  
Pellegrino	  at	  restaurants	  and	  bars.532	  	  	  
While	   bottled	  water	  was	   still	   a	   niche	  market,	   Nestlé	  was	   looking	   to	   continue	  
expanding	  into	  the	  future.	  In	  1998	  Nestlé	  introduced	  Nestlé	  Pure	  Life,	  and	  in	  2000	  
it	  was	  launched	  in	  Pakistan,	  Brazil,	  Argentina,	  Thailand,	  and	  Mexico.	  533In	  2002	  the	  
Perrier	  Vittel	  group	  changed	  its	  name	  to	  Nestlé	  Waters.	  Nestlé	  CEO	  Peter	  Brabeck-­‐
Letmathe	   became	   a	   famous	   voice	   for	   the	   bottled	   water	   industry.	   He	   argued	   for	  
allowing	  markets	  to	  allocate	  prices	  to	  preserve	  resources.	  Brabeck-­‐Letmathe	  stated	  
openly	  that	  “human	  beings	  do	  not	  have	  a	  right	  to	  water.”	  Water	  should	  be	  treated	  
like	  a	  foodstuff,	  “so	  that	  we’re	  all	  aware	  that	  it	  has	  its	  price.”534	  He	  also	  stated	  that	  
steps	   should	   be	   taken	   for	   the	   part	   of	   the	   population	  without	   access	   to	  water.	   In	  
2009,	  Brabeck-­‐Letmathe	  wrote	  in	  Foreign	  Policy	  magazine:	  “Water	  is	  the	  new	  gold,	  
and	  some	  countries	  and	  companies	  are	  already	  banking	  on	  it.”	  In	  2010	  he	  wrote	  in	  
the	  Guardian	  that	  while	  everyone	  was	  paying	  attention	  to	  oil	  water	  just	  became	  the	  
real	   issue:	   “unless	   radical	   changes	   are	   made,	   we	   will	   run	   ot	   of	   water	   first,	   and	  
                                                
531 As quoted in: Forsyth, Hamo, Bottled water has become liquid gold, BBC Business, Nov. 22, 2010. 
532 James, George, “Perrier recalls its water in U.S. after benzene is found in bottles,” The New York 
Times, Feb. 10, 1990. 
533 Shiller, Robert “Marketing Strategy of Nestlé Pure Life,” April 2004.  
534 We Feed The World, documentary, 2005.  
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soon.”	  By	  2013	  water	  would	  account	  for	  about	  10	  percent	  of	  Nestlé’s	  total	  sales	  and	  
they	  would	  be	  the	  dominant	  global	  player	  in	  one	  of	  the	  emerging	  market	  of	  water.	  
In	   the	   U.S.,	   as	   in	   the	   world,	   Nestlé	   is	   the	   number	   one	   selling	   bottled	   water	  
company.535	   According	   to	   Fortune	   500’s	   2013	   listing	   of	   the	   world’s	   largest	  
corporations	  by	  sales	  volume,	  Nestlé	  was	  the	  69th	  biggest	  corporation	  in	  the	  world	  
with	   $98b	  USD	   in	   sales	   and	  $11.5b	   in	  profits.536	  Because	  of	   their	  massive	   capital	  
investments	   Forbes	   considers	   Nestlé	   to	   be	   the	  world’s	   39th	  most	   valuable	   brand	  
and	  eleventh	  in	  Forbes’s	  2013	  rank	  by	  market	  value.	  	  
Despite	   Nestlé	   Water’s	   stance	   on	   the	   global	   stage,	   they	   only	   control	   a	   small	  
share	  of	  the	  Mexican	  water	  market.537	  Mexico	  is	  Nestlé’s	  sixth	  biggest	  market	  and	  
Mexico	   accounts	   for	   about	   3.5	   percent	   of	   Nestlé’s	   total	   sales	   (including	   all	  
products).	   Globally,	   bottled	   water	   accounts	   for	   $8b	   of	   Nestlé’s	   $98b	   per	   year	   in	  
sales.	  Exact	  numbers	  are	  not	  specified	   in	  Nestlé’s	  annual	  report,	  and	  they	  did	  not	  
respond	   to	   requests	   for	   information.	   If	   Mexico	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   representative	   of	  
Nestlé’s	  global	  market,	  one	  estimate	  of	  Nestlé’s	  sales	  in	  2013	  is	  about	  $300	  million.	  	  
Nestlé	   has	   plans	   to	   continue	   to	   invest	   in	   Mexico	   but	   it	   is	   unclear	   how	   this	  
investment	  will	  affect	  the	  bottled	  water	  market.	  In	  Jan.	  2014	  they	  announced	  a	  $1b	  
                                                
535 Nestlé controls about 27% of the US bottled water market, according to Nestlé Waters. 
536 MoneyCNNFortune, Fortune 500 2013, May 20, 2013. 
537 According to a Nestlé press release from 2006, while they controlled less than 10% of Mexico’s water 
market, in that same year they also controlled 15% of Mexico’s entire domestic trade. Grupo Modelo 
S.A. “Press Release: Grupo Modelo signs letter of intent,” Nov. 29, 2006. Accessed Jan. 30, 2014: 
http://www.gmodelo.mx/repository/eventos/eng1299871786278.pdf 
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investment	  plan	  to	  invest	  in	  Mexico,	  but	  the	  announcement	  revealed	  a	  plan	  to	  build	  
a	  new	  dog	  food	  and	  baby	  food	  factory.	  	  
Nestlé	   is	   accustomed	   to	   selling	   a	  product	   and	  altering	   the	  very	   context	  of	   the	  
world	   through	   that	  product’s	  use.	   Instant	   coffee,	   invented	   in	   the	  1930s	  became	  a	  
staple	  for	  troops	  during	  WWII.	  “In	  the	  1990s,	  Nestlé	  turned	  itself	   into	  the	  world’s	  
biggest	   supplier	   of	   bottled	   water	   via	   the	   acquisitions	   of	   Perrier	   and	   San	  
Pellegrino.538Today	   Nestlé	   markets	   “itself	   as	   a	   ‘Nutrition,	   Health	   and	   Wellness	  
company,”539	  
In	  the	  1990s	  Nestlé	  leaders	  made	  a	  push	  to	  locate	  Nestlé	  “towards	  ‘functional’	  
foods,	  foods	  that	  had	  some	  sort	  of	  health	  benefit,	  whose	  sales	  were	  growing	  much	  
faster	  than	  standard	  processed	  foods.”	  Like	  Danone	  they	  make	  their	  money	  selling	  
dozens	   of	   products	   other	   than	  water.	  Water	   is	   just	   one	   holding	   along	  with	   baby	  
food.	   Recently	   Nestlé	   has	   invested	   in	   the	   baby	   food	   business.	   Reports	   tout	   that	  
global	  baby-­‐food	  sales,	  a	  $30bn-­‐plus-­‐market—are	  growing	  by	  10	  percent	  a	  year.540	  
Water	  reports	  tout	  that	  the	  bottled	  water	  market,	  home	  filtration	  market	  and	  water	  
treatment	  technology	  sectors	  will	  grow	  at	  an	  equal	  or	  higher	  rate	  in	  the	  next	  10-­‐15	  
years.541	  In	  Mexico,	  Nestlé	  has	  combined	  the	  baby	  food	  and	  water	  market	  with	  their	  
bottled	  water	  specially	  formulated	  for	  babies,	  Gerber	  water.	  	  
                                                
538 Bottled Life, Nestle and Water, web-page, Bottled Life Film, 2012, accessed at: 
http://www.bottledlifefilm.com/index.php/nestle-and-water.html 
539 Investor’s Chronicle, “Reinventing Nestlé,” Investors Chronicle, July 11, 2013. 
540 Investor’s Chronicle, “Reinventing Nestlé,” Investors Chronicle, July 11, 2013. 
541 Bank of America, The Global Water Sector, Bank of America and Merrill Lynch, Sept. 28, 2011, p33. 
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Worldwide	   Nestlé	   Waters	   “the	   healthy	   hydration	   company,”	   has	   64	   brands:	  
seven	  named	  after	  saints.	  In	  the	  US	  they	  sell	  14	  brands.542	  In	  Mexico	  they	  sell	  three,	  
Nestlé	   Pureza	   Vital,	   Santa	  Maria,	   and	   Gerber,	   “the	   water	   specially	   developed	   for	  
babies.”543	  	  
                                                
542	   Nestlé	  Waters,	  Nestlé	  Water’s	   Brandbook,	   2012.	   The	   US	   and	   Canada	  make	   up	   Nestlé	  Waters	  
North	   America’s	   distribution	   and	   sells	   the	   following	   brands:	   Acqua	   Panna,	   Arrowhead,	   Deer	  
Park,	   Ice	   Mountain,	   Nestea,	   Nestlé	   Pure	   Life,	   Ozarka,	   Perrier,	   Poland	   Spring,	   Resource,	   S.	  
Pellegrino,	  Sweet	  Leaf	  Ice	  Teas,	  Tradewinds,	  Zephyrhills.	  
543 Nestlé Waters, Nestlé Water’s Brandbook, 2012 
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Appendix 4: Price comparison: Bottled Water vs. Tap Water 
 
Bottled	  water	  as	  a	  solution	  for	  societal	  drinking	  water	  is	  a	  more	  costly	  proposition	  
than	   a	   public	   or	   private	   water	   managed	   and	   delivered	   through	   a	   centralized	  
system.	  Bottled	  water	  is	  sold	  at	  approximately	  tens	  to	  thousands	  of	  times	  the	  price	  
of	  treated	  potable	  tap	  water	  (See	  Table	  12).	  	  According	  to	  Global	  Water	  Intelligence	  
Aarhus,	  Denmark	   currently	   has	   the	  world’s	  most	   expensive	   tap	  water	   (see	  Table	  
11).	  Denmark	  paid	  $4.32	  per	  m3	  while	   India	  was	  the	   lowest	  paying	  $0.15	  per	  m3.	  
There	   are	   also	   exotic	  waters	  with	  prices	   in	   the	   tens	   and	  hundreds	   of	   dollars	   per	  
liter.	  To	  calculate	  a	  fair	  range	  of	  price	  comparisons	  one	  approach	  is	  to	  use	  the	  most	  
expensive	  (common)	  bottled	  water	  as	  represented	  by	  the	  bottled	  water	  sold	  in	  US	  
and	   Mexican	   airport:	   Starbucks	   at	   $4	   per	   liter.544	   This	   can	   be	   compared	   to	   the	  
cheapest	  commercially	  available	  waters	   in	  Mexico	  which	  are	  sold	   in	  19L	  garafons	  




                                                
544 According to Said, Sammy, “The Top 10 Most Exotic and Expensive Bottled Waters in the World,” 
The Richest, Jan. 2013, http://www.therichest.com, the most expensive bottled water Acqua de 
Cristallo Tributo a Modigliani (infused with gold flakes) in the world is $60,000 per 750ml which 
makes it 13.9 million times as expensive as Danish tap water, and 500 million times more expensive 
than tap water in India. A more common but still extreme example would be Bling H20 at $40 per 750 
ml which is 12,345 times as expensive as Danish tap water and 353,333 times as expensive as tap 
water from India.  
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Table 11: Average tariffs and water usage in selected countries 
	  
Source: Global Water Intelligence, 2014 
 
	  
A	  ratio	  of	  prices	  can	  be	  established	  by	  dividing	  the	  price	  of	  bottled	  water	  by	  the	  
price	  of	   tap	  water	  and	  converting	   to	   common	  units	  of	  one	   liter	   (see	  Table	  12).	  A	  
range	  of	   these	  prices	  can	   then	  be	  established	  by	  comparing	   the	  price	  of	   the	  most	  
expensive	   bottled	   water	   to	   the	   cheapest	   tap	   water	   and	   the	   most	   expensive	   tap	  
water	  to	  the	  cheapest	  bottled	  water.	  In	  this	  case	  to	  find	  the	  ranges	  of	  prices:	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 Figure 1: Ratio of the most expensive bottled water to the cheapest tap water 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  P	  bottle	  max	  	   	   =	  	  	  	  	  	  	  the	  upper	  bound	  of	  price	  difference	  
	  	  Ptap	  min	  ⁄	  1000l	  
	  
	   	   	   	   =	  4	  ÷	  (.15÷1000)	  	  
	   	   	   	   =	  	   26,667	  
Figure 2: Ratio of the cheapest bottled water to the most expensive tap water 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  P	  bottle	  min	  	   	   =	  	  	  	  	  	  	  the	  lower	  bound	  of	  price	  difference	  
	  	  Ptap	  max	  ⁄	  1000l	  
	  
	   	   	   	   =	  $0.095	  ÷	  ($4.32÷1000)	  	  
	   	   	   	   ≈	  22	  
	  
Using	   the	   global	   range	   of	   prices	   established	   above,	   Starbucks	   bottled	   water	  
purchased	  in	  Sept.	  2013	  in	  Guadalajara	  is	  26,667	  times	  as	  expensive	  as	  the	  world’s	  
cheapest	   tap	  water	   in	   India	  while	   the	  cheapest	  bottled	  water	   in	  Mexico	   is	  still	  22	  
times	   as	   expensive	   as	   the	   most	   expensive	   tap	   water	   in	   the	   world.	   While	   this	  
comparison	  is	  categorical	  it	  would	  be	  useful	  to	  examine	  real	  ranges	  within	  Mexico	  
to	  see	  how	  much	  more	  Mexicans	  are	  spending	  on	  bottled	  water	  than	  on	  tap.	  Using	  
the	   same	   formula	   for	   establishing	   price	   ratios,	   the	   $4	   per	   liter	   of	   water	   at	   the	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airport	   is	   roughly	   6,153	   times	   as	   expensive	   as	   tap	   water	   in	   Mexico	   ($0.65/m3);	  
3,101	   times	   as	   expensive	   as	   tap	   water	   in	   the	   US	   ($1.29/m3)	   and	   926	   times	   as	  
expensive	  as	  the	  tap	  water	   in	  Denmark.	   In	  Mexico	  the	  more	  common	  purchase	  of	  
bottled	  water	  in	  larger	  garafons	  at	  $2	  per	  19L	  is	  still	  666	  times	  as	  expensive	  as	  tap	  
water	  in	  India;	  and	  138	  times	  as	  expensive	  as	  tap	  water	  in	  Mexico.	  	  
The	  $2.79	  for	  a	  liter	  price	  for	  bottled	  water	  in	  the	  US	  at	  a	  convenience	  store	  
in	  January	  2014	  was	  2,163	  times	  the	  price	  of	  tap	  water	  in	  the	  US;	  4,292	  times	  the	  
price	  of	  tap	  water	  in	  Mexico	  and	  18,600	  times	  the	  price	  of	  tap	  water	  in	  India.	  
	  As	   shown	   in	   Table	   12,	   even	   the	   cheapest	   bottled	  water	   sold	   in	   large	   19L	  
containers	   in	  Mexico	   is	   still	   a	  101	   times	  as	  expensive	  as	  a	   tap	  water	   system.	  The	  
larger	  brands	  sell	  garafons	  for	  $2	  to	  $3	  and	  while	  there	   is	  no	  guarantee	  that	  they	  
are	   safe,	   as	   the	  price	   goes	  down,	   the	   likelihood	  goes	  up	   that	   the	  bottled	  water	   is	  
nothing	  more	  than	  packaged	  tap	  water.	  The	  situation	  as	  shown	  in	  Table	  12,	  is	  that	  
Mexicans	  can	  spend	  several	  hundred	  times	  as	  much	  on	  bottled	  water	  delivered	  to	  
their	   homes	   by	   a	   “reputable”	   corporation	   and	   their	   representatives,	   or	   they	   can	  
spend	  100	  times	  as	  much	  on	  water	  that	  may	  be	  as	  risky	  as	  the	  tap	  water	  they	  are	  
avoiding.	   Ironically,	   if	  water	  rates	   in	   India	  or	  Mexico	  doubled	  or	   tripled,	   their	   tap	  
water	  systems	  could	  become	  solvent,	  expand	  and	  gradually	  improve	  their	  services	  
yet	  because	  citizens	  object	  to	  even	  small	  rate	  hikes	  they	  end	  up	  paying	  100s	  if	  not	  
1000s	  of	  times	  more.	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Table 12: Ratios of bottled water prices to centralized tap water systems.  








































1,550 3,076 13,334 











Garafon     
$3.00 /  19L  36 122 229 10,526 
$2.50 /  19L  30 102 202 877 
$2.00 /  19L 22 81.6 162 701 
$1.25 /   19L 15 51  101 438 
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